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The (Surprisingly) Prevalent Role of States
in an Era of Federalized Class Actions
Linda S. Mullenix*
In enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Congress
intended to expand access to the federal courts for interstate class actions
by creating minimal diversity and removal jurisdiction. In Section 2 of the
Act, “Findings and Purposes,” Congress stated that class action abuses
undermined “the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the
Framers of the United States Constitution” in that state courts kept cases
of national importance out of federal court and sometimes demonstrated
bias against out-of-state defendants. Congress stated that a purpose of
CAFA was to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate
cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.” As many
commentators have suggested, CAFA was intended to federalize class
action litigation. An historical examination of dual system complex
litigation illustrates the extent to which federal courts have successfully
(or unsuccessfully) intervened in pending parallel state court proceedings
through application of abstention, the Anti-Injunction Act, preclusion,
and Erie doctrines. In the post-CAFA era, however, class action and other
complex litigation has been federalized in derogation of state enforcement
efforts by providing defendants with more ready access to federal courts.
Nonetheless, state courts have retained jurisdiction over an array of
complex litigation. Despite the federal predisposition of CAFA, states have
retained a role in addressing complex litigation aided by Supreme Court
decisions recognizing the independent role of state courts in enforcing
local legal norms. To a significant extent, state courts have been insulated
from federal judicial encroachment on states’ ability to handle complex
litigation in its own courts, and state attorneys general have in various
ways been empowered to pursue aggregate relief on behalf of state
citizenry.
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States in an Era of Federalized Class Actions

INTRODUCTION
Discussions of complex litigation generally focus on ways in
which federal courts address large scale, aggregative litigation.1
Commentators, however, pay less attention to state courts as
venues for resolving complex litigation2 or the implications for
federalism in responsibility for resolving complex disputes.
Nonetheless, state courts routinely handle complex litigation, and
every state but two has state class action rules.3 Several states have
consolidation statutes4 that essentially replicate the federal
multidistrict litigation statute.5 These state statutes permit transfer
and consolidation to one judicial district for the efficient disposition
of aggregate litigation in one place.6
The existence of a dual court system complicates the ability of
federal and state courts to address complex litigation.
Notwithstanding these tensions, federal and state courts—through
judicial interpretation and legislative initiatives—have developed
means to preserve the public and private enforcement of complex
litigation in state courts. Because parties typically forum shop
strategically to maximize advantage, complex litigation engenders

1. See generally, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict
Litigation in Historical Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (2018) (focusing on resolving federal
complex litigation through federal multidistrict litigation statute); Edward F. Sherman, The
MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205
(2008) (focusing on federal resolution of complex litigation through multidistrict litigation or
federal class litigation).
2. See, e.g., Guthrie T. Abbott & Pope S. Mallette, Complex/Mass Tort Litigation in State
Courts in Mississippi, 63 MISS. L.J. 363 (1994) (discussing influx of complex mass tort cases in
Mississippi and ways in which state courts addressing these cases).
3. See Linda S. Mullenix, Should Mississippi Adopt a Class-Action Rule—Balancing the
Equities: Ten Considerations that Mississippi Rulemakers Ought to Take into Account in Evaluating
Whether to Adopt a State Class-Action Rule, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2005). See generally
LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS (2006) (two-volume treatise on fifty state class
action rules and practice). The two states lacking class action rules are Mississippi and
Virginia.
4. See J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The
Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-district Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 3,
11–12, nn.32–33 (2012) (reporting that New York, New Jersey, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin all have developed intra-system mechanisms for
coordinating related litigation; and that Illinois, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, and
Tennessee have more limited intra-state procedures for intra-state coordination).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018).
6. Glover, supra note 4.
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fundamental issues of federalism and intersystem comity. When
parties simultaneously file duplicative, overlapping cases in federal
and state courts, the dual court system provokes tension between
the courts for primacy over the litigation. When litigants invoke
application of favorable state class action jurisprudence as against
more restrictive federal standards, this invites convoluted Erie
doctrinal issues.
Until the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA),7 plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to strategically forum shop
for advantageous state court forums, and defense attorneys had
little recourse to avoid state court adjudication because state courts
were more than happy to retain their jurisdiction to the derogation
of federal courts. With the enactment of CAFA, commentators
generally agreed that one of the motivating rationales for this
legislation was to federalize class action practice, particularly
regarding mass tort litigation.8 A perhaps more cynical view of
CAFA centered on the sponsors’ intention to relocate class litigation
in federal courts, avoiding so-called state judicial hellholes.9 At the
time of enactment, defense attorneys viewed federal courts as more
favorable venues because of more restrictive federal class
certification rulings.10 To this end, CAFA created new federal
jurisdiction for class actions11 and provided for removal of state
class action into federal court.12 In “federalizing” complex class
actions, the defense bar appreciated CAFA as a victory, and

7. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715

(2018)).
8. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2525–26 (2008) (CAFA legislative history to federalize class actions);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Review, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1006
(2011) (discussing CAFA’s federalization of state class actions). See generally Edward F.
Sherman, Class Action Fairness Act and the Federalization of Class Actions, 238 F.R.D. 504 (2007).
9. Adam Feit, Note, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class
Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 899,
901 (2008) (discussing so-called judicial hellholes); see Nicole Ochi, Note, Are Consumer Class
and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litigation Strategies after CAFA and MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 965, 969 n.31 (2008) (citing AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007 (2007),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf) (describing abuses by state courts).
10. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1887 (2008) (“Thus, CAFA did not
so much save defendants from biased state courts as reward them with access to an
alternative forum that they regarded as more favorable to their interests.”).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
12. Id. § 1453.
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plaintiffs’ attorneys regarded CAFA as a setback for class action
claimants.
The key contribution of this Article is to argue that although
Congress through CAFA attempted to federalize complex class
litigation, state courts nonetheless have continued to perform a
significant role in addressing complex cases. Despite the federal
predisposition of CAFA, states have retained a role in addressing
complex litigation aided by Supreme Court decisions recognizing
and upholding the independent role of state courts in maintaining
and enforcing local legal norms.
In sum, although the received understanding of CAFA was to
federalize complex class litigation, state courts nonetheless have
continued to perform a role in addressing complex cases. To a
significant extent, state courts have been insulated from federal
judicial encroachment on states’ ability to handle complex litigation
in their own courts, and state attorneys general have in various
ways been empowered to pursue aggregate relief on behalf of state
citizenry.
More specifically, several factors have helped preserve the
states’ role in complex litigation. First, the Court has recognized
and upheld the independent role of state courts in maintaining and
enforcing local legal norms. Thus, the Court has upheld the
legitimacy of state courts adjudicating state class litigation
notwithstanding federal court repudiation of certification of the
same litigation.13 In so doing, the Court recognized principles of
federalism and comity, signaled a non-interference stance with
state class proceedings, and strengthened the independent role of
state courts in complex litigation.
Second, a number of federal courts have rejected the primacy of
federal courts in applying Rule 23 class certification standards in
derogation of countervailing state statutes that would prohibit
prosecution of the same class litigation in state court.14
Third, the Court recognized the role of state attorneys general
in their parens patriae capacity under CAFA to retain and pursue

13. See generally Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011).
14. See infra notes 149–152.
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complex litigation on behalf of state citizenry, in spite of defense
attempts to evade state court jurisdiction.15
Fourth, state attorneys general have the right to receive notice
of federal class action settlements and to lodge comments or objections to pending settlements that might affect state constituents.16
Thus, CAFA and the Court have given state attorneys general a
relatively robust role in addressing complex litigation and afforded
significant protection to state auspices in state enforcement efforts.
Fifth, CAFA itself carved out exceptions to its removal
provisions, again recognizing the role of states in adjudicating
complex litigation with exceptions to its removal provisions for
both class and “mass” actions.17 Thus, CAFA acknowledged the
role that state courts might play in resolving completely local mass
actions, which in turn has induced plaintiffs’ artful pleading to
retain complex cases in state jurisdictions.
Sixth, the Court recently rebuffed defendants’ efforts to remove
a covered securities class action from state to federal court.18
Instead, the Court held that the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) did not strip state courts of their
longstanding jurisdiction to adjudicate class actions alleging only
§ 1933 Securities Act violations.19 In enacting SLUSA, Congress did
nothing to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over class actions
based on federal law.
Finally, several federal appellate courts have agreed that state
courts may maintain jurisdiction over defendants’ class action
counterclaims asserted in state litigation.20 In upholding traditional
15. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014); see Loriann E.
Fuhrer, Federal Removal More Difficult in Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, KEGLER
BROWN HILL & RITTER (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.keglerbrown.com/publications/
federal-removal-more-difficult-in-actions-brought-by-state-attorneys-general/ (noting that
an increased obstacle to removal is bad news for corporate defendants who typically prefer
to defend in federal court).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (requiring notification of states’ attorneys general). See
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
18. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
19. Id.; see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(c) (2018).
20. See, e.g., Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2018), aff’d,
139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019); Tri-State Water Treatment, Inc. v. Bauer, 845 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 2017);
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removal principles, these courts have resisted corporate arguments
that CAFA expanded removal jurisdiction to permit removal of
class action counterclaims to federal court. In 2019, the Supreme
Court definitively clarified that the general removal statute prohibits
the removal of state-based class action counterclaims to federal
court, a decision largely favorable to state court class action
plaintiffs.21
Part I of this Article examines the private enforcement of
complex litigation in state courts. This discussion first examines
how federal courts historically—through the abstention doctrine22
and the Anti-Injunction Act23—have acted or failed to preserve
federal primacy over state court management of complex cases.
Although there is a robust tradition of federal intervention in state
parallel proceedings, in other instances federal courts have given
deference to state proceedings. Against this historical backdrop,
this Part discusses whether judicial interpretation of Erie doctrines
support or challenge federalized class action litigation. This Part
then analyzes how the Supreme Court more recently, through
interpretation of preclusion doctrine, preserved the ability of states
to pursue class litigation free from federal interference.
Part II explores the private enforcement of complex litigation in
state courts by examining CAFA provisions creating so-called
carve-outs for purely local cases that are not subject to removal into
federal court. 24 As will be seen, these CAFA provisions have
inspired artful pleading by plaintiffs who prefer to resolve complex
cases in state courts. These plaintiffs have been successful at
keeping their cases in state court under CAFA.
Part III turns attention to the public enforcement of large-scale
litigation affecting the rights of state citizens. This discussion
surveys the role of state attorneys general in protecting citizens

In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2012); Palisades Collections
L.L.C. v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008); Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d
1014 (9th Cir. 2007).
21. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019).
22. See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983) (“Moses Cone” abstention); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976) (“Colorado River” abstention).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018); see also All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(4)(A), (B); see also id. § 1332(d)(3).
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through parens patriae actions25 and how the Court effectively saved
these actions from federal removal through its interpretation
of CAFA’s mass action provisions.26 In addition, this Part examines
the ability of state attorneys general—as provided in CAFA—to
receive notice and provide comment on pending federal class
action settlements.27
Part IV examines the ability of state courts to retain jurisdiction
over class actions alleging violations of the federal securities acts,
and to resist attempts by defendants to remove such litigation to
federal courts.
Part V explores the complex issues raised by a defendant’s
assertion of a class action counterclaim in state court litigation, and
the ability of a third-party defendant sued in such a counterclaim
to remove that class litigation to federal court. The problem of class
action counterclaims, it will be seen, not only implicates thorny
issues of statutory construction, but directly raises the same policy
issues of fair and appropriate forums to adjudicate class litigation
that animate CAFA’s prescriptions. Again, these discussions
reaffirm the conclusion that state courts still play a significant role
in adjudicating certain types of complex litigation despite recent
attempts to federalize complex class actions.
I. RESTRAINING FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT
ON STATE CLASS ACTIONS
A. Background to Federal Intrusion into State Court Complex Litigation
Federal intrusion into state class action litigation rose to
prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, when federal courts managing
complex mass tort cases moved towards settlement models for
resolving these massive litigations.28 The American dual court
25. See generally Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power,
69 SMU L. R EV . 759 (2016) (historical survey of state attorneys general parens patriae
enforcement powers).
26. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 161–63 (2014). See
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 16.
28. See generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (repudiating a
nationwide settlement class of asbestos claims); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997) (same); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995) (approving settlement classes generally); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir. 1989) (approving settlement class of Dalkon Shield claims).
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system permits the institution of parallel and even duplicative
litigation in state and federal courts. As mass tort cases emerged,
entrepreneurial class action attorneys filed similar or exactly the
same cases in both forums.29
The filing of parallel duplicative litigation arising out of the
same events or transactions creates a host of problems for the dual
court system and the litigants pursuing relief in either or both
jurisdictions. In addition to the economic wastefulness inherent in
pursuing the same duplicative litigation in two forums, parallel
litigation further inspires some questionable litigation tactics, such
as a race to judgment in one forum or the other. Regarding class
litigation, the existence of parallel duplicative litigation can induce
parties to engage in a race to class certification or settlement,
precluding adjudication in the parallel forum.30
Moreover, the resolution of duplicative state and federal
litigation through trial or settlement can result in inconsistent
rulings, a consequence which offends our sense of substantive and
procedural justice. This is especially problematic concerning
injunctive relief, where inconsistent rulings from state and federal
courts can create a quandary for liable defendants that may not
know what standards apply to the actor’s forward-looking conduct.
Finally, the problems of parallel duplicative mass tort litigation
took on especial urgency in the 1990s when federal courts moved
towards the settlement class model as the preferred vehicle for
resolving the mass tort cases. In order to preserve pending federal
mass tort settlements, judges turned to the Anti-Injunction Act31 to
shut down or forestall parallel state court settlements that might
undermine a federal settlement.32
Thus, federal courts have two statutory and doctrinal means to
preserve their primacy in massive complex litigation as against
state enforcement in parallel proceedings: federal abstention

29. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (parallel
duplicative lawsuits filed in both stated and federal courts relating to claims arising from
Hyatt Regency Skywalk collapse); see also Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (parallel mass tort salmonella litigation).
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 23.
32. E.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993); Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d; In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act.33 Federal courts rarely have
relied on abstention doctrines when confronted with parallel state
litigation; however, when carefully applied to pending facts, federal
courts have invoked abstention in deference to ongoing state
proceedings.34 In contrast to the sparse use of abstention doctrines
to maintain or decline federal jurisdiction, federal courts frequently
have turned to the Anti-Injunction Act to protect pending federal
class settlements endangered by parallel state litigation. Thus, the
Anti-Injunction Act has provided the most powerful vehicle for
federal courts to encroach upon and restrain states’ independent
enforcement of complex litigation in their own courts.
1. Federal Abstention in Deference to State Complex Litigation
Federal courts have an unflagging obligation to exercise their
rightly conferred jurisdiction.35 The Supreme Court, however, has
indicated that federal courts may under certain circumstances
abstain—that is, decline to exercise their valid jurisdiction in deference to pending parallel state court proceedings.36 Although
abstention doctrine would seem to supply a ready source for
federal retention of complex litigation, federal courts have not
invoked abstention doctrine as a primary means to preserve their
own jurisdiction. Instead, when federal courts carefully apply
abstention doctrine, the courts may yield jurisdiction in deference
to parallel complex litigation.37
The Illinois salmonella mass tort litigation is instructive.38 The
salmonella litigation arose out of individuals who contracted
salmonellosis from drinking contaminated milk manufactured and
distributed by the Jewel Companies and sold under the names of
Hillfarm and Bluebrook. In the early 1980s, plaintiffs filed 143
individual lawsuits in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
and other state courts in Indiana, some of which were class actions.

33. See supra notes 22–23.
34. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 210.
35. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)

(“Colorado River” abstention).
36. See generally 17A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 122 (3d ed. 2010) (federal
abstention doctrines).
37. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 210.
38. Id. The underlying Illinois state litigation is In re Salmonella Litig., Master File No.
85 L 000000 (cited in Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 213).
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The Illinois cases were consolidated for discovery and other pretrial proceedings, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys moved for class
certification.39
After the plaintiffs filed the state court action different plaintiffs
filed another identical salmonella class action in Illinois federal
court, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction.40 The federal case
was identical with the parallel state case, except for different federal
plaintiffs. The defendant then moved the federal court to abstain
from deciding the case—or at least from deciding plaintiff
Schomber’s class claims—out of deference to the pending Illinois
state court proceedings,41 citing Colorado River abstention doctrine.42
Applying factors from Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, the federal
court decided to abstain in favor of the pending Illinois class action.43
The federal court first found that the federal and state lawsuits
were “parallel”—a predicate to invoking abstention doctrine. The
court next held that federal abstention would help to avoid
piecemeal litigation because the burden on the defendant to litigate
in two fora would be great. Therefore, the court decided that the
claims should be confined to a single forum.44 Evaluating the order
in which the parties obtained jurisdiction, the court noted that the
state court, in the earlier action, had undertaken complex
administrative procedures to oversee the action.45 In contrast, the
parties had undertaken almost no pretrial discovery in the federal

39. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 213.
40. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018). The federal complaint was filed on May 3, 1985,

after the pending state court actions. At this time, there was no special diversity provisions
for class actions, which would be created as part of CAFA in 2005. The designated class
representative in the federal action was Allison Schomber.
41. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 215.
42. Id.; see Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976).
43. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 215–18. The Colorado River factors included: (1) the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, and
(3) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the respective forums. The Moses H. Cone
factors included (1) the presence or absence of federal law issues, and (2) the adequacy of the
parallel state court litigation. The decision whether to abstain is within a court’s discretion.
Id.
44. Id. at 217.
45. Id. The court noted the state court consolidation of complaints; the assignment of
one judge to oversee all pretrial proceedings; the organization of a committee of plaintiffs’
attorneys to effectuate discovery and other pretrial proceedings; entry of protective orders;
several contested hearings; and sanctions obtained against the defendant for failure to
preserve evidence. Id.
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court. Although the status of class certification was nascent in both
forums, the federal court concluded that early class certification
was more likely to occur in state court rather than in federal court.46
The court further concluded that the absence of federal issues
removed the one countervailing factor that would otherwise
override concerns about avoiding piecemeal litigation.47 The final
factor in assessing the propriety of abstention—adequacy of the
state forum—presented no reason to weigh against abstention.48
Few reported cases involve invocation of abstention doctrines
to permit complex litigation to proceed in state court as opposed to
federal court. However, the Schomber decision illustrates how a
federal court, analyzing the Colorado River and Moses H. Cone
abstention factors, could determine that federal abstention in favor
of a pending parallel state class action was appropriate under the
circumstances. While abstention doctrine is a path much less taken,
federal courts more have frequently turned to the federal AntiInjunction Act as a doctrinal means for interfering with—or
restraining from interfering with—state class action litigation.
2. The Anti-Injunction Act Constraints of State Court Enforcement
The intersection of the Anti-Injunction Act and state
enforcement proceedings in private complex litigation has an
interesting history. The federal Anti-Injunction Act states that “[a]
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgements.” 49 Generally, the AntiInjunction Act embodies a strong federal policy against federal
interference with state court proceedings.50

46. Id. at 218.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court noted that the Illinois class action statute permitted class certification

for classes that included out of state plaintiffs, so there was no disadvantage to proceeding
under Illinois state law. The court also concluded that the class which the state plaintiffs
sought to certify was in all materials respects identical to the class action in the federal
complaint. Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018); see also All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
50. See generally MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 36, at ch. 121 (Anti-Injunction
Act and three exceptions to Anti-Injunction Act).
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However, in the class action litigation arena, federal courts have
invoked the Anti-Injunction Act both to restrain a federal court
from interference with parallel state class litigation,51 as well as to
uphold federal courts direct interference with state complex
litigation to protect pending federal settlements.52 From an initial
non-interference stance, federal courts completely reversed course
in the mid-1980s to embrace a full-fledged exercise of federal
authority to enjoin parallel state complex litigation.
The potential use of the Anti-Injunction Act to constrain federal
class proceedings in favor of pending state proceedings arose in the
early 1980s in the federal skywalk cases.53 This litigation developed
from the structural collapse of overhead skywalks at the Hyatt
Regency hotel in Kansas City, Missouri in 1981. In the aftermath,
injured claimants filed parallel class litigation in Missouri state and
federal courts. The federal court issued a mandatory class
certification order,54 which two objecting plaintiffs petitioned the
court to vacate in deference to the pending state litigation.55 With
denial of this motion, the objectors filed an appeal.56
The appellate court first examined its own jurisdiction to hear
the objectors’ interlocutory appeal.57 The court concluded that it
had appellate jurisdiction to review the trial judge’s certification
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),58 holding that the mandatory
class certification order amounted to an injunction against the state
court class proceedings.59 The appellate court concluded that the

51. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982)
52. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Joint E.

& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
53. See generally Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d.
54. The court certified the class under Rule 23’s “limited fund” class action, FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)–(B). Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1179.
55. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1177.
56. Id. at 1179.
57. At this time, Rule 23 had not been amended to provide a means for interlocutory
appeal from class certification orders, which the Advisory Committee would add by
amendment Rule 23(f) in 1998. Appeal of the Federal Skywalk class certification order was
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a) and 1651 (mandamus). The judge had refused to
certify his own order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d at 1177, 1179.
58. Id. at 1179–80. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2018) provides, in part: “[T]he courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: Interlocutory orders of the district courts of
the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions . . . .”
59. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1179–80.
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class certification order effectively enjoined the state court plaintiffs
from prosecuting their state court actions for punitive damages.60
The court found that the class certification order enjoined the state
plaintiffs from pursuing their state actions on the issues of liability
for compensatory and punitive damages and the amount of
punitive damages, and that the district court had expressly
prohibited class members from settling their punitive damage
claims.61
Having concluded that the class certification order effectively
operated as a federal injunction against state court proceedings, the
appellate court next considered whether the federal class
action “injunction” came within one of the three exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Act that would permit the federal enjoining of a
state proceeding.62 The court concluded that none of the AntiInjunction Act’s exceptions applied to permit this intrusion into
state class litigation.63
The federal litigants primarily relied on the Anti-Injunction
Act’s “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception to argue in favor
of allowing the federal class action to proceed.64 They bolstered
their argument with judicial concern for the efficient management
of mass tort litigation—presumably in the federal forum.65
Nonetheless, the appellate court rejected application of the
“necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception, holding that
historically this exception applied only to constrain tandem in rem
litigation. The court held that because the federal and state Skywalk
cases were both actions in personam for compensatory and punitive
damages, the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception did not
apply.66 Consequently, the class certification order—as an
injunction against state class proceedings—violated the AntiInjunction Act and could not stand.67
The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act
was a victory for state court plaintiffs, but commentators highly

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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Id. at 1180.
Id.
Id. at 1181–84; see supra note 50 (exceptions to Anti-Injunction Act).
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1181–84.
Id. at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
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criticized the court’s constricted view of the “necessary in aid of
jurisdiction” exception.68 By the mid-1980s, federal judges would
chip away or reject the Skywalk Anti-Injunction holding and
completely reverse course in order to maintain control over
complex class litigation in federal courts.69 The historical arc of the
Anti-Injunction Act beginning in the mid-1980s illustrates a trend
towards increasing federal exercise of power to the derogation of
state private enforcement of complex litigation.
Judge Jack Weinstein’s management of the New York personal
injury asbestos mass tort litigation illustrates the federal doctrinal
shift away from a narrow view of the Anti-Injunction Act as a
68. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 286 (1991) (noting that the Eighth Circuit’s
construction of the Anti-Injunction Act in the Federal Skywalk cases illustrated a narrow
interpretation of the exceptions and “extreme concern for federalism”); Robert C. Gordon,
The Optimum Management of the Skywalks Mass Disaster Litigation by Use of the Federal
Mandatory Class Action Device, 52 UMKC L. REV. 215, 231–32 (1984) (noting articles describing
Eight Circuit’s decision as “’unreasonable,’ ‘untenable,’ ‘arcane,’ ‘obscure,’ ‘unnecessarily
narrow,’ and ‘inequitable’”); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62
IND. L.J. 507, 529, 548–50 (1987) (noting that application of Anti-Injunction Act exceptions
defer to history, rather than well-reasoned thought).
69. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881–82 (11th Cir. 1989)
(stating that a federal court has the power to enjoin a state court action in order to support
the federal court’s continuing jurisdiction over a class action and reasoning that extremely
complex litigation is the equivalent of a “res”); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337
(2d Cir. 1985) (enjoining a state court action that “threatened to frustrate” a federal
proceeding of “substantial scope” which had already required expenditure of substantial
time and was nearing a possible settlement); Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc.,
903 F. Supp. 16, 18 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (finding that the AIA prohibits federal courts from
enjoining class members from continuing to pursue in personam state actions although the
AIA would allow a federal court to bar the commencement of new state actions); In re
Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5142, at *6–9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991)
(holding that where an ongoing class action suit had been in litigation for nine years and
where progress was finally being made in federal court, the potential for resolution justified
enjoining state court proceedings under the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the AIA).
But see In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 144–45 (3d Cir.
1998) (refusing to issue an injunction as necessary in aid of jurisdiction even though the
federal court had previously rejected class certification and a settlement now being approved
in state court); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 960 F.2d 1286, 1298–99 (5th
Cir. 1992) (refusing to interpret the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception so broadly as to allow
injunctions with respect to all federal court class actions); Standard Microsystems Corp. v.
Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating the district court’s injunction
of a state court action as a violation of the AIA, even though the suit involved the same claims
as the federal court action, and distinguishing Baldwin because here the federal court was not
on the verge of settling a complex matter); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Litig., MDL991, 1995 WL 489480, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 1995) (refusing to issue an injunction as
necessary in aid of jurisdiction even though the federal court had previously rejected class
certification and a settlement now being approved in state court).
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constraint on federal courts’ ability to interfere with parallel state
complex litigation.70 In the asbestos litigation, the parties accomplished a class-wide settlement agreement and the court
conditionally certified a mandatory limited fund class pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).71 Judge Weinstein
noted that the certification of the mandatory national class action
would enjoin all pending cases, including those filed in state court,
which implicated the Anti-Injunction Act.72
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in the Skywalk cases, Judge Weinstein
viewed “the ‘necessary in aid of jurisdiction’ exception liberally ‘to
prevent a state court from . . . interfering with a federal court’s
flexibility and authority’ to decide the case before it.”73 Citing an
array of Second Circuit precedents,74 Judge Weinstein held that a
stay of state court proceedings was appropriate under the
“necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception where a federal court
was on the verge of settling a complex matter and state court
proceedings would undermine the federal court’s ability to achieve
that objective.75
Cognizant that courts historically interpreted the “necessary in
aid of jurisdiction” exception as applying solely to parallel in rem
actions, Judge Weinstein creatively concluded that the mandatory
nature of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund settlement was like a res,
and that “under these circumstances, the in rem nature of the court’s
jurisdiction over the class action and the limited fund provides an
additional ground for concluding that a stay of all existing

70.
71.
72.
73.

See generally In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 33–36.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281,
295 (1970)).
74. Id. (citing Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990) (stay
of state court proceedings appropriate to allow federal district judge to “legitimately assert
comprehensive control over complex litigation”); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328,
337 (2d Cir. 1985) (a federal court can issue an injunction against actions in state court that
would “frustrate the district court’s efforts to craft a settlement”).
75. Judge Weinstein further held that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018),
likewise provided federal courts with an affirmative grant of power to certify a nationwide
class action and to stay pending federal and state cases brought on behalf of class members.
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 37.
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proceedings is consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act.”76 In so
doing, Judge Weinstein reached a seeming contradictory conclusion
from that of the Eighth Circuit in the Skywalk litigation.77
Judge Weinstein’s Anti-Injunction Act decision subsequently
gained traction in other mass tort cases on the federal dockets.78
After parties in the Pennsylvania federal district court reached a
tentative nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class settlement of
asbestos claims, other plaintiffs filed a parallel class action in West
Virginia state court naming the same defendants.79 These plaintiffs
sought a declaration that the proposed federal settlement was
unenforceable and not entitled to full faith and credit in the West
Virginia courts, and was not binding on the members of the
purported West Virginia class. They further sought a declaration
that they were adequate representatives with the authority to optout of the federal settlement on behalf of the entire West Virginia
class.
Instead, relying on the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction”
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Pennsylvania district court
granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
enjoining the West Virginia plaintiffs and their attorneys from
taking any further steps in the prosecution of their state claims, or
from pursuing similar duplicative litigation in any other forum.80
The Third Circuit upheld this exercise of federal power,81 noting
that the prospect of federal settlement was imminent, as in other
cases where federal courts had issued injunctions.82 Moreover, the
court found further justification for issuance of the injunction

76. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig, 134 F.R.D. at 38. See also Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d
at 337 (“[A] class action proceeding [was] so far advanced that it was the virtual equivalent
of a res over which the district judge required full control.”).
77. Judge Weinstein distinguished and limited the Skywalk holding, suggesting that
the ground for vacating the class certification in the Skywalk litigation was the absence of a
limited fund: “Properly construed, Skywalk stands only for the proposition that where class
certification is improper because no limited fund exists, a court cannot rely upon the
‘necessary in aid of jurisdiction’ exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to justify a stay of
existing state proceedings.” Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 39.
78. See generally Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993).
79. Id. at 195–96.
80. Id. at 196.
81. Id. at 202–04 (citing In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5142 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991), aff’d mem., 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991)). The court also relied on
the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018). Carlough, 10 F.3d at 202–03.
82. Id. at 203.
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against the state court class proceedings, concluding that the West
Virginia plaintiffs were not requesting relief strictly parallel to the
federal plaintiffs. Instead of seeking compensatory damages for
their injuries, the West Virginia plaintiffs were using the state court
lawsuit to “challenge the propriety of the federal class action:” in
other words, “as a preemptive strike against the viability of the
federal suit.”83 In addition, the West Virginia plaintiffs were
attempting to use the state class action to obtain state court rulings
regarding the state class members’ rights “to opt out of the federal
action.” 84 Given the “mature” phase of the federal settlement
proceedings, and to avoid confusion and havoc, the Third
Circuit upheld the issuance of the injunction against the state
class proceedings.85
B. Shady Grove and Federalizing Class Action Litigation:
Erie Implications
In 2010, the Court in Shady Grove was confronted with a
complicated issue challenging the ability of federal courts to apply
federal class action jurisprudence in a diversity class action, as
opposed to state law pursuant to Erie principles.86 In a famously

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 204. The court held:

At this mature phase of the settlement proceedings and after years of pre-trial
negotiation, a mass opting out of West Virginia plaintiffs clearly would be
disruptive to the district court’s ongoing settlement management and would
jeopardize the settlement’s fruition. In addition, mass opting out presents a
likelihood that the members of the West Virginia class will be confused as to their
membership status in the dueling lawsuits. All members of the [West Virginia]
class are only now receiving notice of the federal suit. A declaration by the West
Virginia court at this time that all West Virginia members of the federal class are
now in the West Virginia suit (and we make no comment as to the legal authority
of the West Virginia court to so rule) could cause havoc.
....
We find it difficult to imagine a more detrimental effect upon the district
court’s ability to effectuate the settlement of this complex and far-reaching matter
than would occur if the West Virginia state court was permitted to make a
determination regarding the validity of the federal settlement.
Id.
86. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010); Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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complicated array of decisions,87 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
concluded that under Erie principles a federal court’s authority to
apply federal Rule 23 class certification standards preempted a
New York state statute that prohibited class status for suits seeking
statutory interest penalties.88
Shady Grove arose in the court’s diversity jurisdiction and the
insurance defendant asked the court to dismiss the federal class
action because it was prohibited under New York law. The district
court granted the dismissal, which the Second Circuit upheld.89
Finding that the New York provision conflicted with Rule 23, the
plurality held that Rule 23 applied as a valid exercise of authority
under the Rules Enabling Act90 in derogation of the different
standard under New York state law.91
Construing the Shady Grove facts as an Erie problem, the Court’s
plurality made scant reference to principles of comity or federalism
integral to the Bayer appeal, or for that matter, Erie doctrine. The
plurality understood, however, that in “keeping the federal-court
door open to class actions that cannot proceed in state court” this
would induce forum shopping.92 Nonetheless, the plurality came
down on the side of favoring uniform federal procedure:
But divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of
forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say
intended) result of a uniform system of federal procedure.
Congress itself has created the possibility that the same case may
follow a different course if filed in federal instead of state
court. The short of the matter is that a Federal Rule governing
procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case
in a way that induces forum shopping. To hold otherwise would

87. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 395. There was no majority decision in Shady Grove. Four
Justices formed the plurality opinion: Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and
Scalia. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and concurred in part. Four Justices
dissented: Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito.
88. Id. at 398–99. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 1975) (precluding actions to
recover penalties from proceeding as a class action).
89. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397–98.
90. Id. at 406–11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072(b) (2018) (Rules Enabling Act conferring
rulemaking authority on federal courts provided that the rules not abridge, enlarge, or
modify substantive rights).
91. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–11.
92. Id. at 415.
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be to “disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over
federal procedure” or Congress’s exercise of it.93

In contrast, the Shady Grove dissenters94 contended that in
diversity cases federal courts had to apply some state procedural
rules that functioned as a part of the state’s definition of substantive
rights and remedies. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Ginsburg
construed the New York statute as a manifestation of New York’s
legislative interest in cabining available remedies. Therefore, the
dissenters would have upheld the federal court’s dismissal of the
litigation.
The dissenting opinion manifests a more robust concern for
issues of federalism and comity in the class action litigation arena,
and is littered with multiple pronouncements indicating that state
interests in diversity cases “warrant our respectful consideration.”95
Citing Justice Harlan, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Erie
doctrine was “one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism,
expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial
power between the state and federal system.”96 Thus, in parsing
Erie doctrine, Justice Ginsburg concluded that Rule 23 and the New
York statute did not conflict, giving rise to no preemption
problem. 97 In her view, the plurality failed to engage in this
threshold inquiry whether the federal rule and the state statute
conflicted. Had the Court done this, “it would not have read Rule
23 to collide with New York’s legitimate interest in keeping certain
monetary awards reasonably bounded.”98
Justice Ginsburg pointed to several Erie decisions where the
Court counseled federal courts to interpret the federal rules with

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 415–16 (citation omitted).
Id. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 437–38 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
97. Id. at 445–46.
98. Id. at 437. The dissent also stated that
“[b]y finding a conflict without considering whether Rule 23 rationally
should be read to avoid any collision, the Court unwisely and unnecessarily
retreats from the federalism principles undergirding Erie. Had the Court reflected
on the respect for state regulatory interests endorsed in our decisions, it would
have found no cause to interpret Rule 23 so woodenly—and every reason not to
do so.
Id. at 451.
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sensitivity to important state interests, and to avoid conflict with
important state regulatory policies.99 She indicated that she “would
continue to interpret Federal Rules with awareness of, and
sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies.”100 In conclusion,
Justice Ginsburg noted the irony inspired by enactment of CAFA,
which opened the door to state-based class actions to be removed
to federal courts. In so doing, Congress envisioned fewer—and not
more—class actions overall. Thus, “Congress surely never
anticipated that CAFA would make federal courts a mecca for suits
of the kind Shady Grove has launched: class actions seeking statecreated penalties for claims arising under state law—claims that
would be barred from class treatment in the [s]tate’s own courts.”101
C. The Class Action Fairness Act, Smith v. Bayer,
and Non-Preclusion of Class Certification Decisions
The influx of the massive complex class litigation on federal and
state court dockets in the late 1970s and early 1980s inspired a crisis
mentality, inspiring numerous institutional studies and reform
proposals.102 After a decade of adventuresome and creative judicial
case management of mass tort cases during this period,103 including
efforts at joint federal-state coordination of these cases,104 federal
99. Id. at 442. Justice Ginsburg suggested that the Court had “veer[ed] away” from
this approach, in favor of a mechanical reading of the federal rules, which was “insensitive
to state interests and productive of discord.” Id. at 442–43; see also id. at 457–58 (“We have
long recognized the impropriety of displacing, in a diversity action, state-law limitations on
state-created remedies.”).
100. Id. at 437.
101. Id. at 459.
102. See, e.g., MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES (1988); SPECIAL
COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. SYS., AM. BAR ASS’N, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE
CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984);
Am. Bar Ass’n, Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action
Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986); AM. LAW INSTIT., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994).
103. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions—Past, Present, and Future, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1008 (2017) (commenting on the early period of adventuresome
management innovations by district courts in handling mass tort cases); Linda S. Mullenix,
Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 522
(2013) (commenting on adventuresome efforts by federal courts in the 1980s to resolve mass
tort class litigation).
104. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the
Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending
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courts reversed course in a landmark series of decisions that
signaled antipathy towards resolving mass tort class litigation in
federal courts.105 The federal courts indicated that the proposed
mass tort litigations could not satisfy the Rule 23 requirements,
especially the predominance criterion because of the presence of
highly individualized issues of causation, liability, and proof. In
addition, these proposed nationwide mass tort cases implicated
complex choice of law issues, as well as Seventh Amendment
relitigation problems.106
At the end of the 20th century, the Supreme Court further
buttressed this federal hostility to sweeping classwide remedies,
rejecting two landmark nationwide asbestos class settlements.107
Given the federal courts’ manifest lack of receptivity towards
adjudicating class litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys instead turned to
state courts as the forums of choice for pursuing resolution of
complex class litigation.108
Between 1995 and 2005, state courts became the plaintiffs’
forums of choice for class certification and settlement. Several state
court venues that embraced liberal certification and settlement
standards proved especially receptive to class litigation, becoming
magnet courts for forum-shopping litigants.109 In turn, the defense
in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529 (1995); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial
Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689
(1992).
105. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertification of
nationwide class of penile implant claimants); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737
(5th Cir. 1996) (reversal of certification of nationwide class action of nicotine-addicted
claimants); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing
certification of nationwide HIV tainted blood products class).
106. See generally Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393.
107. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods, Inc. v Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also Lahav, supra note 103, at 1007–08 (decisions in Fibreboard and
Amchem closed off possibility of mass tort settlements).
108. See 3 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 22.12 (4th ed. 2018) (“The reluctance of federal courts to certify such classes over the next
decade, the move by plaintiffs to state court for class action certification, the enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) removing many state court class actions to federal
court, all contributed to the reduced likelihood that a Rule 23(b)(3) class will be certified for
a mass tort class.”).
109. A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 245
(2007) (describing legislative history to CAFA and need to combat plaintiffs’ lawyers’ ability
to game the system to keep nationwide class litigation in state courts); John Stevens, Note,
Securing “Steady, Upright and Impartial Administration of the Laws”—The Federalist-Based
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bar protested against what it deemed the defendants’ consignment
to plaintiff-favoring judicial hellholes and the ability of plaintiffs’
attorneys to “game the system” and keep class litigation in favorable state courts.110 During this decade, defense interests united to
promote Congress to enact federal legislation to redress the
perceived pro-plaintiff imbalance in forum opportunities.111 This
legislative initiative succeeded in the 2005 enactment of the Class
Action Fairness Act.112
CAFA created a new federal diversity jurisdiction provision in
Rule 23 for class actions and added a new statutory provision for
state class actions to be removed to federal court.113 Pursuant to
CAFA, a proposed class has to embrace at least 100 claimants with
an aggregated amount in controversy in excess of $5 million. CAFA
further authorized jurisdiction over class actions that satisfied
minimal diversity requirements.114 In addition to the original
diversity provisions, CAFA also enacted new removal provisions
for state class actions.115 These removal provisions eliminated the
general removal requirement that all defendants agree to the
removal, and they eliminated the one-year removal deadline.116
CAFA’s enactment heralded a return of class litigation back to
federal courts, because for the first time Rule 23 explicitly created a
rule basis for diversity class actions and enhanced the federal forum
opportunity by requiring only minimal diversity among the parties
to the litigation.117 The new removal statute similarly facilitated the
removal of state class actions to federal court by relieving the
removing defendants of certain requirements in the general

Imperative For Class Action Reform, 3 GEO. J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 361, 367 (2005) (describing
plaintiffs’ manipulative behavior to accomplish questionable class certifications and
settlements in state courts).
110. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 11.
111. Class Action Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2341 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 49 (2002) (testimony of John Beisner, defense attorney involved in
drafting CAFA legislation).
112. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018).
114. Id. § 1332(d).
115. Id. § 1453.
116. Id. § 1453(b).
117. Id. § 1332(d).
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removal statutes, such as the requirement that all defendants
consent to the removal.118
In the broader context of dual-system federalism, CAFA
represented a rebalancing of power and authority over complex
litigation in favor of federal forums. In practical terms, CAFA
represented a victory for defense interests and a setback for the
plaintiffs’ class action bar. While academic scholars focused on
CAFA’s implications for theories of federalism,119 attorneys viewed
CAFA less in abstract conceptual notions of federalism and more in
the strategic ramifications for controlling litigation outcomes.
Against this background, then, the Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp.,120 in which the Court returned
power to state courts in the conduct of their class litigation, proved
something of a surprise, especially following the Court’s decision
in Shady Grove in the preceding year. Although CAFA signaled the
opening of a new era of federalized complex litigation, the Supreme
Court in 2011 threw a surprising “lifeline” to state courts in their
ability to retain independent authority over class action litigation.121
The Court’s Bayer decision presents an interesting contrast to
Shady Grove.
In Bayer, a unanimous Court held that a West Virginia state
court retained the ability to determine whether a West Virginia
class action was suitable for class certification under state rules,
notwithstanding that a Minnesota federal district judge had denied
class certification in a parallel class action brought against the same
defendant.122
The Bayer litigation returned to the vexing problem of parallel,
duplicative class litigation in federal and state courts. While CAFA
enabled defendants to remove state class litigation to federal court,

118. Id. § 1453.
119. See, e.g., David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism

Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247 (2007) (discussing
federalism implications of CAFA); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class
Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate
Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929 (2008) (discussing federalism implications of
CAFA).
120. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011).
121. See generally Mark Moller, The New Class Action Federalism, 48 AKRON L. REV. 861,
866–74 (2015) (characterizing the Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer as “The Roberts Court
Throws Federalism a Lifeline”).
122. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 302.
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it did not completely forestall the institution and pursuit of state
class litigation. Hence, although the defense bar had gained a
forum-strategic advantage through CAFA, this advantage would
be lost if plaintiffs could simply circumvent the consequences of an
adverse federal certification by filing in a more plaintiff-friendly
state court. Whereas federal courts had developed a substantial
Anti-Injunction Act jurisprudence relating to state court litigation
in deference to pending federal class settlements,123 the courts had
not developed a similar doctrinal approach to class certification
decisions.
Although the Court touched on the underlying federalism
concerns in Bayer only in passing, the Bayer litigation provides an
interesting illustration of the intersection of federalism concerns
with complex litigation that parties pursue in a dual-court system.
George McCollins sued the Bayer Corporation in West Virginia
state court alleging various state law claims arising from Bayer’s
sale of the prescription drug Baycol. The plaintiff contended that
Bayer violated the West Virginia consumer protection statute and
express and implied warranties in selling him a defective product.
He asked the state court to certify a class action of West Virginia
residents pursuant to West Virginia’s Rule of Civil Procedure 23.124
Shortly after McCollins filed his lawsuit, another plaintiff, Keith
Smith, sued Bayer in a different West Virginia state court alleging
claims similar to McCollins’s action. Smith also requested the court
to certify a West Virginia class under the West Virginia class action
rule. Bayer then removed McCollins’s case to the District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction.125 After removal to federal court, McCollins’s case was
transferred to the District of Minnesota, which was overseeing a
multidistrict consolidation of Baycol litigation in federal courts.126
Bayer was unable to remove Smith’s case to federal court because
Smith had joined several non-diverse defendants in his lawsuit,
thereby defeating a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction and
123. See Andrea R. Lucas, Note, Balancing Comity with the Protection of Preclusion: The
Scope of the Relitigation Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 97 VA. L. REV. 1475, 1478–90 (2011)
(historical interpretation and application of the Anti-Injunction Act relitigation exception);
supra notes 49–84.
124. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 303.
125. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (2018) (diversity and removal jurisdiction statutes).
126. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 303; see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (multidistrict litigation statute).
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frustrating removal. 127 Smith’s suit remained in West Virginia
state court.
The Minnesota federal court first decided McCollins’s motion
to certify a class of West Virginia Baycol purchasers, before
consideration of class certification in state court. The federal court
declined to certify the proposed class on two grounds. First,
construing West Virginia law, the court concluded that the case
could not be certified because each individual class member would
have to show actual injury to recover for the claimant’s use of
Baycol. Second, the court determined that individual issues
predominated over common issues, therefore failing to satisfy the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement for class certification.128
Bayer then requested that the Minnesota federal court enjoin
the West Virginia state court from hearing Smith’s motion for class
certification, arguing that Smith’s case was identical to the
proposed West Virginia Baycol class action that the federal court
declined to certify. The district court granted Bayer’s motion,
concluding that the restraining order was appropriate in order to
protect its judgment in the McCollins lawsuit, relying on the third
“relitigation exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act.129
Thus, the Bayer litigation shifted judicial concern from the
settlement arena to the Anti-Injunction Act’s authority to empower
federal courts to intervene in pending state class certification
proceedings, a much earlier stage in class litigation. This inquiry
focused on a different Anti-Injunction Act exception than the “in
aid of jurisdiction” provision that courts invoked to protect federal
settlements. Similar to the line of cases upholding federal court
authority to enjoin pending state class litigation to protect
settlement class agreements, the district court concluded that the
relitigation exception authorized interference with the West Virginia
court’s ability to certify a class action.

127. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 303.
128. Id. at 304; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (predominance requirement). The court also

dismissed McCollins’s claims on the merits, for his failure to show actual physical injury
from his use of Baycol. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 304.
129. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 302–03. The “relitigation exception” is the third exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act, which permits a federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding to
“protect or effectuate [the federal court’s] judgments.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2283; supra notes 49–
50.
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s order.130 The court held that the Anti-Injunction Act’s
relitigation exception authorized the federal injunction because
issue preclusion rules barred Smith from seeking certification of his
state class action. The court reasoned that Smith was invoking a
similar class action rule and the same legal theories to seek
certification of the same class as McCollins. The state court class
certification issue was sufficiently identical to the federal
certification issue to warrant preclusion. In addition, the court
found that McCollins’s and Smith’s interests were aligned, and
therefore Smith was bound by the federal court’s judgment.131
The Supreme Court reversed. Citing recent precedent,132 the
Court acknowledged that the relitigation exception authorized
federal courts to prevent state litigation of a claim or issue that was
previously presented to and decided by a federal court. 133
However, the Court further suggested that a federal court could
enjoin a state court proceeding “only if preclusion is clear beyond
peradventure.”134 Hence, the Court’s evaluation of the lower
courts’ propriety in issuing the injunction against West Virginia
state court proceedings devolved into a convoluted discussion of
the requirements of preclusion doctrine.135
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on the nearidentity of the text of the federal and West Virginia class action
rules as the basis for concluding that issue preclusion was
appropriate under the relitigation exception. The Court noted:
That was the right place to start, but not to end. Federal and state
courts, after all, can and do apply identically worded procedural
provisions in widely varying ways. If a State’s procedural provision
tracks the language of a Federal Rule, but a state court interprets
that provision in a manner federal courts have not, then the state

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2010).
Bayer, 564 U.S. at 305.
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
Bayer, 564 U.S. at 306; see Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 147.
Bayer, 564 U.S. at 307. The Court noted that “[d]eciding whether and how prior
litigation has preclusive effect is usually the bailiwick of the second court (here, the one in
West Virginia). So issuing an injunction under the relitigation exception is resorting to heavy
artillery.” Id.
135. Id. at 308–17.
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court is using a different standard and thus deciding a
different issue.136

With this nod towards federal deference to state court
proceedings, the Court pointed out that “the West Virginia
Supreme Court has gone some way toward resolving the matter
before us by declaring its independence from federal courts’ interpretation of the Federal Rules—and particularly of Rule 23.”137 The
Court observed that in other pharmaceutical class litigation, the
West Virginia Supreme Court had eschewed the litigants’ reliance
on federal class certification precedents, seeking “to avoid having
[their] legal analysis of [their] Rules ‘amount to nothing more than
Pavlovian responses to federal decisional law.’”138 Moreover, the
West Virginia Supreme Court’s approach to the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement differed from that of federal jurisprudence; therefore, a state court using the state standard would
most likely decide a class certification decision differently than an
earlier federal court determining the same issue.139 The Court held
that a federal and state court could apply different law, and a
federal court’s determination of one issue does not preclude the
state court’s determination of another. “It then goes without saying
that the federal court may not issue an injunction.”140
The Court further rejected the federal court’s binding Smith to
the federal class certification judgment as a nonparty to that
litigation. 141 The Court observed that the doctrine rejecting
nonparty preclusion countered Bayer’s policy argument relating to
dual-system class litigation. Bayer contended that reversal of the
136. Id. at 309–10. The Court continued: “So a federal court considering whether the
relitigation exception applies should examine whether state law parallels its federal
counterpart. But as suggested earlier, the federal court must resolve any uncertainty on that
score by leaving the question of preclusion to the state courts.” Id. (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 310.
138. Id. at 310–11 (citing In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 61 (W. Va. 2003) (class
certification in pharmaceutical mass tort approved)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 312.
141. Id. at 314–15. The Court concluded that the federal denial of class certification
could not bind Smith, a nonparty to the rejected class. The Court determined that because
Federal Rule 23 requirements were not satisfied, no properly conducted class action existed
at any time during the dual class proceedings. In absence of certification under Rule 23, the
precondition for binding Smith to the federal decision was not met. The Court noted that the
weight of scholarly authority agreed that an uncertified class action could not bind proposed
class members. Id. at 316 n.11.
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Eight Circuit’s decision would encourage serial relitigation of class
certification decisions, with unsuccessful federal litigants
decamping to more receptive state courts in order to obtain class
certification.142 The Court concluded that “principles of stare decisis
and comity among courts [would] mitigate the sometimes
substantial costs of similar litigation brought by different
plaintiffs[,]” but that the right approach did not lie in binding
nonparties to a judgment.143
Finally, the Court noted that congressional enactment of CAFA
largely abated the issues raised by the Bayer dual-court litigation.
CAFA was not in effect when McCollins and Smith filed their West
Virginia class actions. Because CAFA created a minimal diversity
jurisdiction statute for class litigation, if CAFA had been in effect
then, Bayer could have removed Smith’s class action to federal
court where it would have been transferred to the Minnesota MDL
for a unified class certification decision.144
Thus, the Court’s Bayer holding was narrowly confined to its
pre-CAFA facts and of limited doctrinal import for future postCAFA litigation. In deciding Bayer, the Court clearly focused on
articulating preclusion doctrine,145 paying less attention to issues
(or policy concerns) presented by dual-court class litigation. The
Court clearly thought the nub of the problem lay in appropriate
application of preclusion doctrine, suggesting that litigants who
were disgruntled with the Court’s holding could seek congressional
modification of established preclusion doctrine.146

142. Id. at 316 (“Bayer warns that under our approach class counsel can repeatedly try
to certify the same class ‘by the simple expedient of changing the named plaintiff in the
caption of the complaint.’”).
143. Id. at 317.
144. Id.
145. A good deal of scholarly commentary on the Bayer decision likewise focused on
the implications of preclusion doctrine as applied to class litigation. See generally Richard D.
Freer, Preclusion and the Denial of Class Certification: Avoiding the “Death by a Thousand Cuts,”
99 IOWA. L. REV. BULL. 85 (2014); Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a
Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action,
99 IOWA L. REV. 1659 (2014).
146. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 318 n.12 (“[N]othing in our holding today forecloses legislation
to modify established principles of preclusion should Congress decide that CAFA does not
sufficiently prevent relitigation of class certification motions. Nor does this opinion at all
address the permissibility of a change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
this question.”).
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Notably, the Court made only passing reference to principles of
federalism, offhandedly suggesting that “[f]inally, we would expect
federal courts to apply principles of comity to each other’s class
certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.”147 In
spite of its relatively under-developed discussion of federalism
concerns, the Court reiterated that in evaluating Anti-Injunction
Act issues, the Court for more than forty years consistently had
maintained that “[a]ny doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of
permitting the state courts to proceed.”148 The Court concluded that
the Bayer litigation did not strike the Court as even a close issue
because the issues in the federal and state lawsuits differed because
the relevant legal standards differed. Moreover, the mere proposal
of a class in the federal action could not bind parties who were not
parties there.149
Although the Court’s Bayer decision is cabined by its unique
time-bound facts,150 it nonetheless reflects the Court’s deferential
mindset towards the role of independent state class litigation in a
dual court system.151 Significantly, Bayer was a unanimous decision,
suggesting that the issues relating to dual-court class litigation
were not resolved along liberal-conservative ideological lines.152
The Court’s deferential attitude, rhetorically grounded in principles
of comity,153 marks a departure from the appellate courts’ AntiInjunction Act “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” line of decisions.
Whereas the appellate courts had weaponized the Anti-Injunction
Act to permit intervention in parallel state class litigation, the Court
147. Id. at 317.
148. Id. at 318 (alterations in original) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of

Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U. S. 281, 297 (1970)).
149. Id. at 318.
150. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Multiple Attempts at Class Certification, 99 IOWA L. REV.
BULL. 137, 138, 142–44 (2014) (criticizing the Court’s decision in Bayer; suggesting unresolved
broader questions of preclusion doctrine, federal common law, and due process constraints).
151. See Mallori Allen, Note, Classing Up the Relitigation Exception?: Federalism,
Injunctions, and Class Actions in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011), 37 S. ILL. U. L.J.
219, 232–36 (2012) (arguing that Bayer decision still has importance in post-CAFA
environment because class actions can still remain in state courts).
152. Court watchers might have anticipated that the Court’s conservative wing would
have decided in favor of the Eighth Circuit’s order restraining relitigation of the class
certification decision (the argument advanced by the defendant Bayer), while the Court’s
liberal wing would have favored the independent ability of the West Virginia state courts to
decide the class certification anew.
153. See Lucas, supra note 123, at 1513–18 (arguing in favor of narrow interpretation of
the Anti-Injunction relitigation exception in the interests of comity and federalism).
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in Bayer constrained the use of the Anti-Injunction Act for this
purpose. Instead, the Court reiterated its longstanding understanding of the Anti-Injunction Act as a restriction on federal
interference with state court proceedings.
In hindsight, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend why the
Court granted certiorari and decided the appeal in Bayer. With the
enactment of CAFA, the certification issue presented in Bayer
became a self-correcting problem. Indeed, the Court recognized
this in its closing remarks.154 Simply stated, in the post-CAFA
litigation world, the problem presented in Bayer is unlikely to be
replicated and the Court need not have decided the case. PostCAFA, minimally diverse state class actions such as Smith’s are
now subject to removal, thereby obviating the need for a federal
injunction against a proposed state class certification because the
state class action would no longer be present in state court. Apart
from the opportunity to expound on preclusion doctrine, the
Court’s Bayer decision seems an occasion to endorse doctrines of
comity and federalism regarding dual system class litigation.
In both Shady Grove and Bayer, the defendants acted in rational
self-interest based on their understanding of the advantages or
disadvantages of federal class action jurisprudence compared to
underlying state law. Although the Court in these cases located the
issues in federalism concerns, the litigants were motivated less by
abstract federalism concepts than outcome-driven strategy. The
federal defendant’s request for dismissal in Shady Grove was
intended to avoid federal certification standards (that would have
permitted certification) in deference to more restrictive state class
standards (that would have prohibited the class proceeding). Thus,
the Shady Grove defendant desired application of state law to avoid
federal class proceedings. In Bayer, on the other hand, the federal
defendant—having successfully defeated class certification under
federal standards—sought to enjoin the West Virginia court from
proceeding precisely because the more liberal West Virginia class
certification standards would have allowed the class to proceed in

154. See id.
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state court.155 The Bayer defendant, then, desired application of
federal law to avoid state class proceedings.
Whereas the Shady Grove Court preempted state law based on
its understanding of Erie doctrine as applied to conflicting federal
and state rules, the Bayer Court one year later acknowledged that
the differing class certification standards required the Minnesota
federal court to yield to the West Virginia state court. In Shady
Grove, the Court parsed Erie doctrine to give primacy to federal
adjudication of class litigation unfettered by countervailing state
law; in Bayer, the Court parsed preclusion doctrine to reach the
opposite result.
The Shady Grove plurality opinion by no means settled the issue
of conflicting class certification standards in a dual-court system—
the problem of inconsistent federal and state class standards
persists. Indeed, the Shady Grove dissenting and concurring opinions
provided courts with alternative grounds to give primacy to state
law regarding class litigation, and several federal courts have so
ruled. For example, several states have consumer protection
statutes that prohibit plaintiffs from pursuing class action relief
under those laws.156 In addressing whether a federal court should
apply Rule 23 to disallow the actions, some federal courts have
followed Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion to preempt state law
provisions that disallow class action treatment of certain types of
claims.157 However, other courts have concluded that state statutes
differ from the statutes in Shady Grove and its progeny, instead
defining substantive rights (or what a consumer needs to prove in

155. For an excellent discussion of the political and ideological implications of the Shady
Grove opinions, and the seemingly inexplicable alignment of liberal and conservative Justices
either supporting or rejecting federal class proceedings over more restrictive state class
litigation statutes, see Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1178–79 (2011).
156. See Wilson v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 17-23033-Civ-Scola, 2018 WL
4623539, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (citing the consumer protection laws of Ohio and
Utah as examples); see also Delgado v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., No. 13-CV-4427 (NGG)
(ST), 2017 WL 5201079, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2017) (consumer protection statutes of
Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee explicitly prohibit class actions to enforce terms).
157. See Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir.
2015) (upholding application of Rule 23 to permit class proceedings in federal court;
prohibition of private class claims under Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act superseded
by Rule 23, much like state statute under review in Shady Grove); Fejzulai v. Sam’s W., Inc.,
205 F. Supp. 3d 723, 726 (D.S.C. 2016) (citing Shady Grove).
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order to succeed on a claim).158 In these cases, courts have held that
requiring a plaintiff to proceed in federal court would illegitimately
abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive state law right, and
“federal rules cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights
and remedies.”159
II. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:
THE CAFA CARVE-OUTS FOR STATE COMPLEX LITIGATION
The Supreme Court preserved a role for state courts in managing certain complex cases by disallowing removal of certain of
these cases to federal court under CAFA’s mass action provision.160
In addition, Congress in CAFA legislatively carved out a role for
state courts to adjudicate certain complex cases of a purely local
character. Thus, contrary to the notion that CAFA completely
federalized class litigation, the statutory scheme recognized a role
for state courts in resolving local controversies. Congress, then,
desired to immunize some types of dispute from federal intrusion.
A. The CAFA Carve-Out Provisions
for Home State and Purely Local Actions
Generally, CAFA created new federal diversity jurisdiction for
class actions.161 Although CAFA created new opportunities for
defendants to originally file class litigation in federal court or to
remove class actions from state court, the CAFA statutory scheme
fashioned three exceptions to removal by which a district court
could decline to exercise jurisdiction: (1) the home state exception,162
(2) the local controversy exception,163 and (3) the discretionary

158. Wilson, 2018 WL 4623539, at *13; see also Delgado, 2017 WL 5201079, at *10. In
Delgado, the court followed Justice Stevens’ concurring Shady Grove opinion and applied the
class action bar incorporated in the Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee consumer protection
laws over Rule 23. The court “conclude[d] that the specific inclusion of a class action bar in
the Alabama (and Tennessee and Georgia) consumer protection laws evinces a desire by the
state legislature to limit not only the form of the action but also the remedies available,
placing those bars squarely within Justice Stevens’ concurrence.” Id.
159. Wilson, 2018 WL 4623539, at *13 (quoting Beal ex rel Putnam v. Walgreen Co., 408
F. App’x 898, 902 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010)).
160. See infra notes 169–183 and accompanying discussion.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018).
162. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
163. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
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jurisdiction of district courts.164 These exceptions set forth a
complicated and confusing array of requirements by which federal
courts were required to decline removal jurisdiction —or by
exercise of discretion—were permitted to remand class actions
originally filed in state court.165
The home state and local controversy exceptions are
mandatory; if the statutory criteria are satisfied, then a district court
must decline jurisdiction and remand a removed class action to
state court. The home state exception provides that a district court
shall decline to exercise jurisdiction when “two-thirds or more of
the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and
the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed.”166
The local controversy exception sets forth a more complicated
schema of criteria. To come within the local controversy exception,
more than two-thirds of proposed class members must be citizens
of the state; at least one defendant must be a citizen of the state; the
defendant’s conduct needs to have formed a significant basis for
the claims; the class members’ principal injuries should have
occurred where the action is filed; and plaintiffs should not have
filed another class action asserting the same or similar allegations
during the previous three years.167
164. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
165. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:

A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1527 (2008) (“CAFA’s exceptions, or some of
them, are numbingly complicated and, as already observed, well calculated to keep lawyers
and courts busy for years in work that advances the cause of substantive justice not one
wit.”).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
167. Id. §1332(d)(4)(A). To satisfy the local controversy exception, “(i) a class action”
must meet the following criteria:
“(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes
in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed; at least 1 defendant is a defendant—
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff
class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed;
and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related
conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was
originally filed; and
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In addition to the home state and local controversy exceptions,
CAFA provided federal courts with discretionary authority to
decline jurisdiction over removed class actions.168 Similar to
CAFA’s other jurisdictional exceptions, the discretionary criteria
are cumbersome and unartfully drafted:
[a] district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the
totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction . . .
over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than
two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed.169

In evaluating the “totality of the circumstances,” CAFA enumerates
six factors that a federal court must consider.170
Not surprisingly, CAFA’s removal provisions engendered a
raft of appellate litigation, largely centered on issues relating to
allocation of burdens of proof,171 satisfaction of the amount in

(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class
action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any
of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.”
Id.
168. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
169. Id.
170. Id. A federal court must consider these factors:

“(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the
action was originally filed or by the laws of other States;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid
Federal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class
members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than
the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other
members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States;
and
(E) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or
more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same
or other persons have been filed.”
Id.
171. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of
Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2008) (discussing controversies over allocation of
burdens of proof in CAFA removal exceptions); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of
Jurisdictional Proof, 59 ALA. L. REV. 409 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s allocation and shifting of
burdens of proof for removal jurisdiction).
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controversy requirements,172 artful drafting to evade removal,173
the definition of citizenship,174 the definition of the primary or
significant defendant,175 and other issues.176 However, notwithstanding the myriad problems engendered by CAFA’s complicated
home state and local controversy removal exceptions, federal
courts have declined their jurisdiction and remanded class
litigation to originating state courts.
Class litigation engendered by the events surrounding
Hurricane Katrina illustrate how federal courts, applying CAFA
exceptions, may remand litigation to state court.177 In the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans, class representative
Preston filed a class action in Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, a state court. The action was brought on behalf of patients
and relatives of deceased patients against Tenet Health Systems
Memorial Medical Center and LifeCare Management Services LLC.
Preston alleged that Memorial, the owner and operator of the
hospital, acted negligently in failing to design and maintain the
premises in a manner to avoid power loss in the hospital building.
Preston asserted claims for intentional misconduct, reverse patient
dumping, and involuntary euthanization. In addition, the petition
alleged that Memorial and LifeCare failed to develop and
implement an evacuation plan for its patients. Because the

172. See generally Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014)
(CAFA removal petition need not include evidentiary support for amount-in-controversy
allegations); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013) (stipulation to amount-incontroversy could not bind class members for purpose of CAFA jurisdiction).
173. See generally Marc S. Werner, Note, The Viability and Strategic Significance of Class
Action Alternatives Under CAFA’s Mass Action Provisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 465, 468–96 (2015)
(discussing artful pleading under CAFA).
174. See generally Tim Barham, Note, Class Action Water Crisis: Resolving Flint’s New Split
Over CAFA’s Local Controversy Exception, 70 BAYLOR L. REV. 149 (2018) (discussing Sixth
Circuit’s decision allowing for presumed citizenship of class members in state where action
brought).
175. See generally Amanda Coney, Comment, Defining “Primary Defendants” in the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 67 LA. L. REV. 903 (2007) (discussing problems in defining primary
or significant defendant for CAFA jurisdiction).
176. See generally Gina M. Intrepido, Notice Expertise May Help Resolve CAFA Removal
Issues, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 759 (2005) (discussing practical problems of identifying
class members’ citizenship for purposes of removal requirements and use of experts to
resolve this issue).
177. See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804 (5th Cir.
2007) (affirming district court’s order remanding class litigation to Louisiana state court).
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defendants failed to timely evacuate the facility after Hurricane
Katrina, this led to the death and injuries of hospital patients.178
LifeCare filed a notice of removal, but Memorial never
consented to the removal. After removal to the Federal District
Court for Louisiana, Preston moved to remand the litigation under
CAFA’s local controversy exception. The district court granted
Preston’s remand petition under CAFA’s local controversy
exception, home state exception, and the discretionary jurisdiction
provision.179
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
application of the CAFA removal exceptions.180 The court indicated
that “Congress crafted CAFA to exclude” from removal “only a
narrow category of truly localized controversies.”181 To this end,
CAFA provided district courts with the ability to ferret out the
“controversy that uniquely affects a particular locality to the
exclusion of all others.”182 The court concluded that the Hurricane
Katrina litigation “symbolizes a quintessential example of
Congress’ intent to carve-out exceptions to CAFA’s expansive grant
of federal jurisdiction when our courts confront a truly localized
controversy.”183
The court noted that CAFA’s discretionary jurisdiction
provision provided a particularly well-suited framework affecting
the jurisdictional issue. The court enumerated the ways in which
the litigation especially fit within the requirements for
discretionary remand: (1) a nexus existed between the Louisiana
forum, the defendants, and the proposed class, (2) the defendants
were citizens of Louisiana, (3) the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed acts in Louisiana that caused injuries and deaths
to patients hospitalized in New Orleans, Louisiana, and (4) the
claims involved negligence governed by state law.184 In addition,
Memorial did not challenge that the lawsuit fulfilled the general
requirements for CAFA removal, that is, that the class contained
the requisite number of class members, there was minimal diversity
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 808.
Id. at 808–09.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 812.
Id. (citing Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 823.
Id. at 812.
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between plaintiffs and defendants, and the proposed action satisfied
the aggregate amount in controversy.185
Instead, Memorial challenged the requirement that greater than
one-third of the putative class members were Louisiana citizens at
the time of Preston’s filing the class petition. Memorial argued that
failing to satisfy that citizenship requirement, the action was
ineligible for discretionary remand to state court.186 Establishing the
putative citizenship of the class members in the wake of the
hurricane proved to be a difficult enterprise, compounded by lost
records and dispersion of claimants to other states.187 Nonetheless,
after a lengthy discursive analysis of the legal standards relating to
citizenship and evidentiary proof, the appellate court concluded
that based on the record as a whole, the district court made a
reasonable assumption that at least one-third of the class members
were Louisiana citizens at the time of filing of the lawsuit.188
After addressing and rejecting Memorial’s challenges to the
citizenship, composition, and size of the proposed class, the
appellate court upheld the remand based on an analysis of the
statutory factors for determining whether remand was in the
interest of justice.189 The court concluded that the litigation did not
affect national interest as contemplated by CAFA; the majority of
claims were governed by Louisiana law; and there was a distinct
nexus between the Louisiana forum and the class members, the
alleged harm, and the defendants.190 The court further found that,
based on its citizenship analysis, the “number of citizens of the State
in which the action was originally filed . . . is substantially larger
than the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among
a substantial number of States.”191 Finally, the court noted that the
record did not indicate that the plaintiffs had intentionally pleaded
the case to avoid federal jurisdiction, and the defendants did not
assert such an objection.192

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 812–20.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 822–23.
Id.
Id. at 823 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(E)(3) (2018)).
Id. at 822–23.
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Similar to the citizenship challenge that defendants raised in the
Hurricane Katrina litigation, the problem of defining citizenship for
application of the CAFA exceptions has vexed the federal courts.
All three of the CAFA exceptions involve a determination of a state
class member’s citizenship. Courts generally agree that the party
seeking remand to state court carries the burden of proving a CAFA
exception.193 In addition, most courts have agreed that the
definition of “citizenship” for CAFA purposes is the same as it is
for diversity jurisdiction purposes, meaning a person’s domicile
with an intent to remain.194
Federal courts that have applied a strict understanding of
citizenship in the context of the CAFA exceptions have impeded the
ability of plaintiffs to keep certain class litigation in state forums.
The problem of establishing citizenship for CAFA purposes is
especially problematic in litigation where evidentiary proof is
difficult or impossible to obtain, as the Hurricane Katrina litigation
illustrated. Nonetheless, some federal courts have departed from
this narrow interpretation of citizenship requirements and instead
have permitted remand based on a presumption of residency and
domicile.195
Thus, at least some federal courts have liberally construed the
requirements of CAFA’s local controversy exception to mandate
remand to state court.196 The Sixth Circuit upheld remand of class
litigation brought on behalf of residents and property owners in
Flint, Michigan, relating to contamination of their water supply.
The plaintiffs alleged professional negligence against Lockwood,
Andrews, & Newman, Inc. of Texas and its Michigan affiliate,
Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C. (Lockwood Michigan), the
civil engineering firms the city engaged to rehabilitate and provide
quality control to Flint’s water supply.197 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants knew the water treatment facility needed upgrades
for lead contamination treatment, yet they did not ensure that the

193. See, e.g., Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C., 842 F.3d 383, 388–89 (6th
Cir. 2016).
194. E.g., id. at 389–90 (reasoning that citizenship is co-extensive with a person’s domicile).
195. See id.
196. Id. (affirming district court decision to presume class citizenship based on
residency). See generally Barham, supra note 174 (discussing the Flint, Michigan, water
contamination litigation).
197. Mason, 842 F.3d at 386, 388.
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proper safeguards were in place—a failure that caused widespread
personal injuries and property damage due to the contaminated
water supply.198
The defendants removed the litigation to federal court, and in
response, the plaintiffs asserted that the district court was obligated
to decline jurisdiction under CAFA’s local controversy exception.199
The district court granted the motion to remand. On appeal, the
issue before the court was whether the local controversy exception
was properly applied.200 The defendants contended that two of the
local controversy exception’s requirements were not met: (1) that
Lockwood Michigan was not a defendant whose conduct formed a
significant basis for the claims alleged by the plaintiffs, and (2) that
plaintiffs had not produced evidence establishing that greater than
two-thirds of the proposed class were citizens of Michigan.201
The appellate court affirmed the remand, applying a
presumption of residency that satisfied the local controversy
citizenship requirement. Although virtually all federal courts have
rejected a residency-domicile presumption in the context of the
local controversy exception, the Sixth Circuit permitted the
presumption for two reasons: (1) CAFA’s local controversy
exception was not jurisdictional, and (2) the residency-domicile
presumption applied because of the difficulties in proving the
domicile of a mass of individuals.202
In the context of judicial restrictive rulings, it is difficult to
assess the efficacy of CAFA’s home state and local controversy
exceptions as a means of preserving the domain of state courts to
adjudicate class litigation. Nevertheless, some federal courts
apparently have eschewed formalism in favor of a holistic view of
the essential nature of complex disputes, as well as the practical
difficulties plaintiffs face in carrying burdens of proof on CAFA
removal, especially regarding the citizenship of class members. In
so doing, these courts have conserved a role for state courts to
maintain jurisdiction over class litigation originally filed there.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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Id. at 388.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 392.
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III. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:
PRESERVING THE ROLE OF STATES’ ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Federal courts have vacillated in their approach to dual-system
complex litigation based on their varying interpretations of
abstention doctrines, the Anti-Injunction Act, and Erie principles.
In the context of this otherwise muddled landscape, the Supreme
Court effectively bolstered the state role in protecting citizens
involved in aggregate litigation by preserving state parens patriae
actions from removal to federal court.203 If Congress intended to
federalize class action litigation post-CAFA, then the Court carved
out a distinct role for state attorneys general in pursuing aggregate
relief in state forums, notwithstanding CAFA.
The enactment of CAFA set the stage for conflict between
federal and state jurisdiction over parens patriae actions by creating
a removal opportunity for “mass actions.”204 CAFA defined a mass
action as any civil action “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or
more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that
the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”205
CAFA created new minimal diversity jurisdiction for class and
mass actions in which the aggregate amount in controversy
exceeded $5 million.206 However, unlike a class action, a federal
court could exert jurisdiction in a mass action only over those
plaintiffs whose claims individually satisfied the $75,000 amountin-controversy requirement. 207 Through artful pleading then,
plaintiffs could successfully keep aggregate litigation in state court
by pleading that individual claims amounted to less than $75,000.
CAFA’s creation of new federal jurisdiction for “mass actions”
was driven by the same policy considerations that animated
enactment of CAFA: defendants’ desire to avoid large-scale
aggregate litigation in plaintiff-favoring state forums. 208 The
203. See generally Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014).
204. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11)(A)–(B)(i) (2018) (mass action removable under

§§ 1332(d)(2)–(10), 1453).
205. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
206. Id. § 1332(d)(2), (6), (11)(A).
207. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
208. See Werner, supra note 173, at 471 (noting fears of CAFA’s proponents that
plaintiffs’ attorneys could subvert CAFA’s goals by bringing aggregate lawsuits through
joinder rules or other procedural alternatives, thus circumventing federal jurisdiction; noting
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defense bar recognized that creating removal jurisdiction for statebased class actions would not completely address the problems
members of the defense bar faced in state court because plaintiffs
could evade removal simply by joining numerous claimants in an
action that was not denominated as a class action.209 In addition,
defendants were vulnerable to aggregate litigation in state courts
that lacked class action rules, such as Mississippi, but nonetheless
permitted large-scale joinder of parties.210 From the defense
perspective, a mass action was functionally the equivalent of a class
action: if a mass action walked like a class action duck and quacked
like a class action duck, then it was a class action duck.211
CAFA’s mass action provision swiftly created tension with state
parens patriae actions, wherein state attorneys general brought
actions representing the interests of groups of citizens. In response
to parens patriae actions, defendants sought removal under CAFA’s
mass action provisions, contending that state parens patriae actions
satisfied CAFA’s mass action requirements and were simply class
actions in disguise. The CAFA challenges to removal of state parens
patriae actions engendered a split among federal authorities. The
Fifth Circuit held that parens patriae actions were mass actions
subject to removal,212 while the Second,213 Fourth,214 Seventh,215 and
Ninth Circuits216 held that parens patriae actions had only one
plaintiff—the state—and therefore fell short of the mass action
requirement of at least 100 claimants.217 Resolving this conflict, the
Court in 2014 rejected the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion and agreed
with the majority of federal courts that state parens patriae actions
were not CAFA mass actions subject to removal.218
the particular threat raised by lenient Mississippi rules permitting joinder of large numbers
of claimants in absence of a state class action rule).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See 151 CONG. REC. 1641–42 (2005) (statement of Sen. Lott) (suggesting that mass
actions are class actions in disguise and should be subject to removal the same as class actions).
212. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins., 536 F.3d 418, 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2008)
(relying on CAFA’s overarching purpose in extending federal court jurisdiction and
removing class action look-alikes).
213. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 219–20 (2d Cir. 2013).
214. AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2012).
215. LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 772–74 (7th Cir. 2011).
216. Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670–72 (9th Cir. 2012).
217. Id. at 672.
218. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 176 (2014).
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A. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics:
Saving State Parens Patriae Actions
The Hood parens patriae litigation arose in Mississippi, one of the
few states lacking a class action rule. The Mississippi Attorney
General brought a parens patriae lawsuit on behalf of Mississippi
citizens who purchased liquid crystal display panels from
manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of these panels. The state
AG alleged that the defendants engaged in a price-fixing scheme in
violation of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act and the
Mississippi Antitrust Act.219 The AG sought injunctive relief, civil
penalties, attorney’s fees, and restitution for its own purchases of
LCD products and for the purchases of its citizens.220
The defendants filed a notice of removal, arguing that the AG’s
action was either a class action or a mass action subject to CAFA
removal. The district court first held that the AG’s action did not
qualify as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
However, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent,221 the court held that
the AG’s action qualified as a mass action because it was a civil
action in which monetary claims of 100 or more persons were
proposed to be tried jointly on the grounds that the plaintiffs’
claims involved common questions of law or fact.222 The Fifth
Circuit agreed that under its Caldwell precedent, the Mississippi
AG’s action qualified as a mass action subject to removal.223
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed,
applying a statutory construction analysis to CAFA’s text.224 The
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 166.
Id.
Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
CAFA defines a mass action as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the
plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)
(2018). In addition, CAFA specifies that federal jurisdiction over mass actions shall exist only
over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement of $75,000. Id.
223. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 799–800 (5th Cir.
2012), rev’d, 571 U.S. 161 (2014). A concurring judge noted that after the Fifth Circuit’s Caldwell
decision, three other appellate courts had concluded that similar state AG parens patriae actions
were not mass actions suitable for removal under CAFA. Id. at 805 (Elrod, J., concurring).
224. Hood, 571 U.S. at 161–68. The Court stated that the issue presented on appeal “is
whether a suit filed by a State as the sole plaintiff constitutes a ‘mass action’ under CAFA
where it includes a claim for restitution based on injuries suffered by the State’s citizens.” Id.
at 164.
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Court held that because the State of Mississippi was the only named
plaintiff in the action, the case was not a mass action as defined by
CAFA’s plain text.225 The Court rejected the defendants’ contention
that CAFA’s mass action provision referred to the number of real
parties in interest to the claims, regardless of whether those persons
are named or unnamed. Instead, the Court pointed out that in
defining what type of litigation constituted a mass action, the
statute stated “100 or more persons,” and not “100 or more named
or unnamed real parties in interest.”226 In addition, CAFA’s text
supplied additional support by referring to “plaintiffs” as the
parties who were proposed to join their claims in a single trial.227
The defendants offered no reason to believe that Congress intended
to extend the real party in interest inquiry to CAFA’s jurisdictional
requirements.228
The Court concluded that the term “plaintiff” was “among the
most commonly understood of legal terms of art: It means a ‘party
who brings a civil suit in a court of law.’”229 It did not mean any
named or unnamed person whom a lawsuit might benefit.
Construing legislative intent in enacting CAFA, the Court noted
that Congress focused on persons who were actually proposing to
join together as named plaintiffs. Thus, “[r]equiring district courts
to pierce the pleadings to identify unnamed persons interested in
the suit would run afoul of that intent.”230
The Court also rejected, as administratively unfeasible, the
notion that a federal district court would be tasked with identifying
claimants in the mass action whose claims were for less than
$75,000.231 Even assuming that it was possible to sever such persons
and remand their claims to state court, “much of the State’s lawsuit
could proceed in state court after all, simultaneously with the
newly severed parallel federal action.”232
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 169–72.
Id. at 173–75.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 171–72 (indicating that this requirement raised the prospect of an
administrative “nightmare” for federal courts to ascertain, based on evidentiary hearings,
which claims were worth more or less than the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold for federal
adjudication).
232. Id. at 172.
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Hood was a clear victory for state attorneys general in their
capacity to pursue aggregate litigation in state court, free from
federal interference by way of removal under CAFA’s mass action
provisions.233 Indeed, as one scholar noted, an impressive forty-six
state AGs filed amici briefs in Hood urging the Court to narrowly
construe CAFA’s mass action provision in order to retain state
jurisdiction over complex litigation. 234 More expansively,
commentators have suggested that the Hood decision is a victory for
consumers and likely to encourage more parens patriae actions, in
some instances with state AGs partnering with private plaintiffs’
attorneys to resolve these complex cases.235
B. The Role of State Attorneys General
in Reviewing Federal Class Settlements
While the Court in Hood narrowly interpreted CAFA’s mass
action provision to preserve a role for state AG parens patriae
actions, the CAFA statute explicitly recognizes a role for state AG
participation in reviewing federal class action settlements.236 This
state AG participation is effectuated through a CAFA provision
that requires settling defendants to notify appropriate federal and
state officials of the pending federal class action settlement. The
relevant federal official is the U.S. Attorney General. The relevant
state officials are those who have “primary regulatory or
supervisory responsibility with respect to the defendant, or who

233. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation:
A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 320 (2014) (commenting favorably on Hood as
relatively unencumbered means for state attorneys general to hold defendants accountable
for injuries to state citizens); Thomas, supra note 25, at 763 (stating that the Court recognized
the role of state courts in adjudicating mass tort litigation and that the decision “seems likely
to accelerate the rise of parens patriae suits as an alternative to class actions”); Patrick
Hayden, Comment, Parens Patriae, the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Path Forward: The
Implications of Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 124 YALE L.J. 563, 564 (2014)
(suggesting that the Court’s decision in Hood signaled “an apparent tolerance of litigation
strategies designed to maneuver around CAFA and resist removal to federal court”).
234. Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805,
1810 (2018).
235. Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class
Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 524 (2014) (noting impact for consumers and fact that private
plaintiffs’ attorneys are frequently hired to assist state attorneys general in prosecuting
consumer class litigation in state AG proceedings).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2018). See generally Sharkey, supra note 16 (discussing CAFA
notice provision history and impact).
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licenses or otherwise authorizes the defendant to conduct business
in the State,” or, by default, the attorney general of any state in
which any class member lives.237
Whether a CAFA notice is sent to state officials depends on if a
proposed settlement impacts its citizens and not on the state’s
membership in the class. The CAFA notice requirement is triggered
when parties to a federal class action have filed a proposed
settlement, which a federal judge must approve in a fairness
hearing.238 Prior to receiving approval for the proposed settlement,
defense counsel must inform the court of its compliance with the
CAFA notice provisions by showing that the defendant has
provided notice to the appropriate official of every state in which
class members reside. 239 Appropriate notice to state officials
includes copies of the complaint, class notice, proposed settlement,
and other pertinent materials.240
The CAFA notice provision is “intended to give states a role in
ensuring that [their] citizens are equitably compensated in class
action settlements.”241 Congress intended the CAFA notice
requirement to enable states to safeguard their citizens’ interests,
rather than their own. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report for
CAFA indicates that the notice requirement “provides an
additional mechanism to safeguard plaintiff class members’ rights
by requiring that notice of class action settlements be sent to
appropriate state and federal officials, so that they may voice
concerns if they believe that the class action settlement is not in the
best interest of their citizens.”242
A judge’s order giving final approval of a proposed settlement
may not be issued until ninety days after appropriate notification

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)(2).
Id. § 1715(b).
Id.
Id. § 1715 (b)(1)–(8).
California v. Intelligender, L.L.C., 771 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014); see id. at 1172
(“CAFA expressly provides that the defendant in a class action must provide notice to the
appropriate state official of any proposed settlement, presumably so that the state may
comment upon or object to the settlement’s approval, if the State believes the terms
inadequately protect state citizens.”).
242. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6; see also id. at 35
(“[N]otifying appropriate state and federal officials of proposed class action settlements will
provide a check against inequitable settlements in these cases.”).
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to state and federal officials,243 which provides officials time to act
if they wish to respond with comments or objections to the
proposed settlement.244 If a defendant fails to comply with the
notice provision, a class member can choose not to be bound by the
settlement agreement.245 In response to CAFA notification of
pending federal settlements, state officials may file objections to the
settlements246 or choose to file public lawsuits on their own.247
Although there are reported instances where state officials have
filed objections to federal class action settlements or filed reactive
class litigation based on the same claims, the overwhelming
majority of cases indicate that federal and state officials rarely
comment or object to pending federal class settlements.248 This
raises the question of whether the CAFA notice provision is little
more than a paper tiger, particularly in effectuating congressional
intent to protect state citizens’ interests in class action settlements.
The reasons for this apparent state lassitude in commenting on or
objecting to federal class action settlements remain unexplored.
Nonetheless, there is statutory authority for state officials to engage
in the federal class action arena to protect state interest.
IV. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:
SECURITIES CLASS LITIGATION UNDER SLUSA
The Court recently preserved states’ ability to adjudicate class
actions alleging only securities violations of the 1933 Securities
Act,249 reaffirming the capacity of state courts to resolve federal

243. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(d).
244. See, e.g., Harrison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 5:13-cv-01180-BLF, 2018

WL 5292057, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2018) (finding CAFA notice properly provided to
federal and state officials and no comments or objections to proposed settlement received
by court).
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(1); see In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., No. 08-3301, 2015 WL
9273274, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2015) (finding Louisiana’s receipt of the CAFA Notice
insufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that the State was aware that it was a class member
and voluntarily chose to have its claims resolved by the Settlement Agreement).
246. Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411,
449 (2018) (citing Response Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorneys General of Alaska et al. in
Opposition to the Proposed Second Amended Settlement Agreement and Release, Figueroa
v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (No. 05-21251-CIV)).
247. Id. (discussing California v. IntelliGender, L.L.C., 771 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014)).
248. Westlaw search federal case database, search “CAFA notice” w/75 “1715.”
249. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018).
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claims.250 In so holding, the Court resolved and clarified a longsimmering controversy concerning the jurisdictional provisions of
the 1933 Securities Act, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA),251 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 (SLUSA).252 The Court unanimously held that SLUSA
did not strip state courts of their longstanding jurisdiction to
adjudicate class actions alleging only 1933 Act violations and did
not authorize removing such suits from state to federal court.253
The controversy concerning whether states are the appropriate
forum for adjudicating securities class action arose as a
consequence of a complicated, intersecting set of statutes governing
securities litigation. Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in response to perceived abuses of
securities class action lawsuits. The PSLRA instituted numerous
substantive and procedural reforms of securities litigation. 254
Congress’s intention in enacting the PSLRA was to federalize
securities class litigation and to tighten up the requirements for
pursuing such litigation255 as well as limiting remedies available in
these cases. As such, enactment of the PSLRA was part of the class
action reform efforts sought by corporate defense interests and
paralleled the restrictive federal class action jurisprudence
emerging in the mid-1990s.

250. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
251. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
252. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018)). See generally Mitchell A. Lowenthal &
Shiwon Choe, State Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Securities Act Class Actions, but the Frequent
Failure to Ask the Right Question Too Often Produces the Wrong Answer, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739
(2015) (describing the conflict among federal courts concerning whether federal securities
class actions can proceed in state court or must be adjudicated in federal court); Steven J.
Roeder, The Seventh Circuit Widens a Split Among the Circuits on SLUSA Preemption of State
Class Actions, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 2018, at 1, 1 (“SLUSA bars state law breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty class actions that look much different than the standard securities
cases SLUSA was intended to preempt and prevent.”); Trevor M. Cutaiar, Comment, Are
Securities Act of 1933 Claims Filed in State Court Removable Under the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005? A Proposed Resolution to a Statutory Conflict, 55 LOY. L. REV. 559 (2009) (discussing
conflict between CAFA removal provision and non-removable provision of the Securities
Act).
253. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1078.
254. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
255. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067.
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In reaction, and to evade the various PSLRA reforms, many
plaintiffs subsequently shifted their securities class litigation from
federal to state courts.256 In 1998, Congress amended the PSLRA
with enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998. The general purpose of the SLUSA was to address the
unintended consequence of the PSLRA,257 and to stem the shift
from federal to state courts. SLUSA was aimed at requiring that
significant securities class actions be litigated in federal court,
subject to the requirements of the PSLRA.258
After Congressional enactment of SLUSA, federal courts issued
conflicting decisions concerning whether securities litigation could
proceed in state court or were required to be adjudicated in federal
court. 259 The debate centered on whether cases alleging
“exclusively federal securities class action claims” under the
Securities Act of 1933 and that contained no pendent state law
claims could proceed in state court or were required to be litigated
in federal court. Generally, courts agreed that state court class
actions that alleged both Securities Act claims and state law claims
should proceed in federal court. But federal courts divided over
whether exclusively federal securities class actions that
alleged no state law claims could proceed in state court (where
these class actions would not be subject to the PSLRA’s
requirements) or whether they could only proceed in federal court
(where they would be subject to the PSLRA’s requirements).260

256. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82.
257. Id.; see also Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067.
258. See : Hearing on S. 1260 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.

& Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Sec. of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) (“We held a hearing earlier this year
to take a look at how the [PSLRA] was being received and how it was working. We
discovered from that hearing that a new loophole was being exploited, that what was
occurring is that there has been a shift of these lawsuits into State courts. So Senator Dodd
and I thought about this, looked at it, and decided to introduce a bill that basically says that
for class action suits, and class action suits only, where you are dealing with a stock that is
traded nationally, so there is clearly an overriding national interest, that those suits have to
be filed in Federal court.”).
259. See Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 252, at 742–43 nn.6–8 (cataloging the conflicting
trial and appellate decisions on whether SLUSA permitted or prohibited removal of stateinitiated securities class litigation).
260. Id.
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In 2018, the Supreme Court resolved this debate in Cyan, Inc. v.
Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund. 261 Cyan, a
telecommunications company, involved a stereotypical securities
class action litigation. Three pension funds and an individual
investor purchased Cyan stock shares in an initial public offering.
When their shares declined in value, the investors brought a class
action lawsuit in California Superior Court. Their complaint
alleged that Cyan’s offering documents contained material
misstatements, in violation of the Securities Act of 1933, and did not
assert any state-based claims.262
Cyan moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Cyan contended that SLUSA stripped state courts of
the power to adjudicate 1933 Act claims in “covered class actions.”
In response, the plaintiffs argued that SLUSA left intact state court
jurisdiction over all lawsuits, including “covered class actions” that
alleged only 1933 Act claims. The California Superior Court agreed
with the plaintiffs and state appellate courts denied review of that
ruling.263
On appeal, the Supreme Court sought to bring conceptual order
among the multiple statutory provisions relating to federal and
state court jurisdiction over securities class litigation, engaging in
an exhaustive exercise of statutory construction. First, the Court
noted that in enacting the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933,
Congress created private rights of action for securities violations,
authorizing concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over such
lawsuits,264 and barred removal of securities actions from state to
federal court.265 In the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—which
related not to the issuance of stock, but to its subsequent trading—
Congress provided exclusive jurisdiction over securities violations
in federal court. Thus, a plaintiff could not go to state court to
litigate a 1934 claim.266 In 1995, the PSLRA made substantive and
procedural changes to the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which applied in
state and federal courts.267
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

1600

Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1078.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1066 (citing Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 86).
Id. (citing Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 87).
Id. at 1066 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 902–03).
Id. at 1066–67.
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The Court noted that Congress’s enactment of SLUSA was
intended to remedy the unintended consequence of plaintiffs
pursuing security class litigation in state court. Turning to the issue
presented by SLUSA, the Court first addressed the SLUSA
prohibition of security “covered class actions” based on state law.268
The Court noted that according to SLUSA’s definitions, a “covered
class action” embraced a class action where damages were sought
on behalf of more than fifty persons.269 Second, the Court concluded
that SLUSA completely disallowed, in both state and federal courts,
sizable class actions that were founded on state law and alleged
dishonest practices respecting a nationally traded security’s
purchase or sale.270 Third, the Court concluded that any such covered
actions removed to federal court were subject to dismissal.271
Nonetheless, the Court determined that two additional SLUSA
conforming amendments272 did nothing to deprive state court
jurisdiction to decide class actions brought under the 1933 Act, and
therefore state court jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims “continues
undisturbed.”273 Construing SLUSA’s various limitations and
conforming amendments, the Court concluded that SLUSA barred
certain securities class actions based on state law, and authorized
removal of those actions to be dismissed by a federal court. “But
the section says nothing, and so does nothing, to deprive state
courts of jurisdiction over class actions based on federal law.”274
Moreover, the Court rejected Cyan’s attempt to bar state court
jurisdiction based on SLUSA’s legislative history.275 The Court
pointed out that federal 1933 Act claims litigated in state courts
would necessarily have to apply the PSLRA’s substantive reforms.276
Summarizing its statutory scorecard, the Court indicated that
pursuant to its reading of SLUSA: (1) all covered class actions must
proceed under federal law, (2) most (i.e., those alleging 1934 Act
claims) must proceed in federal court, and (3) some (i.e., those
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 1067 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2018)).
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)).
Id. at 1067–68 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)).
Id. at 1068.
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1072–73 (even assuming clear text can ever give way to purpose, Cyan would
need some monster arguments on this score to create doubts about SLUSA’s meaning).
276. Id. at 1073.
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alleging 1933 Act claims) may proceed in state court.277 The Court
declined to speculate why Congress declined to require 1933 Act
class actions be brought in federal courts: “[P]erhaps it was because
of the long and unusually pronounced tradition of according
authority to state courts over 1933 Act litigation.”278 Finally, the
Court rejected the Government’s reading of SLUSA that would
permit removal of 1933 Act class litigation to federal court. The
Court concluded that under the SLUSA statutory scheme, only
state-law class actions alleging security misconduct were subject to
removal. Conversely, federal lawsuits alleging only 1933 Act claims
remain subject to the 1933 Act’s ban on removal.279
The Court’s Cyan decision is noteworthy for several reasons.
Significantly, it evidences yet another recent Court decision
reaffirming state court authority to adjudicate class action claims,
free from federal intrusion by way of removal jurisdiction.
Although the Court indicated that the 1933 Act claims, as tried in
state court, would be subject to federal PSLRA standards, the Cyan
decision nonetheless represented a victory for plaintiffs seeking to
vindicate their class rights in a state rather than a federal forum.
Moreover—similar to the Bayer and Hood decisions—a unanimous
Court agreed on the Cyan holdings and results. The Court’s
unanimity in giving deference to state forums, in this cluster of
cases, belies the prevalent narrative of a conservative, procorporate Court lacking sympathy for class action plaintiffs. None
of the Justices dissented or offered fractured concurring opinions;
all approved state courts as appropriate jurisdictions to resolve
mass claims. Notably, the defendants in Bayer, Hood, and Cyan all
lost their appeals to retain their class action advantage of their
forum-shopping in the federal arena.
V. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS:
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTION COUNTERCLAIMS
A. The Problem of the Defendant Counterclaim Class Action
In a procedural complication that perhaps only procedural
wonks could appreciate, yet another means for retaining state
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1075–78.
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jurisdiction over class litigation arises when a defendant asserts a
class counterclaim in state court.280 This interesting situation arises
in the following scenario: a plaintiff files an individual lawsuit
against a defendant in state court, and the defendant responds by
asserting a class action counterclaim against the plaintiff. In this
setting, may the subject of the counterclaim remove the case to
federal court under CAFA, or may the state court retain jurisdiction
over the counterclaim class action?281
Federal removal jurisdiction refers to a defendant’s right to
remove a case from state court to federal court when a plaintiff sues
the defendant in state court.282 The defendant’s right of removal is
a longstanding right, traceable to principles of federalism embedded
in the American dual court system. The defendant’s right of
removal respects both a plaintiff’s original choice of forum
counterbalanced by a defendant’s right to a neutral, non-biased
forum.
A defendant may remove a case from state to federal court
provided that the defendant can demonstrate a valid basis for
federal court jurisdiction, either in the court’s federal question or
diversity jurisdiction. Removal is governed by a statutory scheme.
The general removal statute—28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)—provides that
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the [appropriate] district court
of the United States.”283
A defendant may remove a state case within a federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction only if no defendant is a citizen of the state in
which the plaintiff brought the action.284 This limitation derives

280. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Finding Room for State Class Actions in a Post-CAFA
World: The Case of the Counterclaim Class Action, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 193 (2007) (definitive
article on the possibility of state defendant counterclaim class actions). Tidmarsh concludes
that defendant class action counterclaims should not be removable under CAFA, thereby
ensuring “some wading room for state courts to contribute to the development of the law of
class actions.” Id. at 196.
281. See generally Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019). A portion
of the following discussion and analysis is derived from Linda S. Mullenix, Just Who Is a
Defendant? Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants’ Removal Rights Under CAFA, PREVIEW U.S.
SUP. CT. CASES, Jan. 7, 2019, at 33.
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018).
283. Id.
284. Id. § 1441(b)(2).
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from the underlying rationale for diversity jurisdiction, which is to
protect a defendant from in-state bias. Therefore, if a defendant is a
citizen of the state in which the plaintiff sues, the presumed bias
against out-of-state defendants is not present. In addition, if a state
lawsuit entails both state and federal claims, the removal statutes
permit a defendant or defendants to remove the entire case to
federal court.285 When a plaintiff sues multiple defendants, all the
defendants must be notified and agree to the removal.286
Congress provided a special removal provision for state-based
class actions in CAFA. Pursuant to this provision, any defendant
sued in a state class action has the right to remove the class action
to federal court.287 The language of the CAFA removal statute
differs from the general removal statutes in three significant ways.
First, the CAFA removal provision allows for removal by “any
defendant” sued in a state class action, rather than by “the
defendant or the defendants” authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).288
Second, in multiple defendant cases, CAFA does not require that
all the defendants consent to removal to federal court.289 Third,
CAFA permits removal to federal court even where one or more of
the defendants is a citizen of the state where the plaintiff sues.290
Courts generally respect and defer to a plaintiff’s original choice
of forum. In Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, the Court affirmed
that removal was a defendant’s right solely, and not a plaintiff’s
right.291 This common-sense conclusion was based on the fact that
plaintiffs originally may choose where to bring their lawsuits, and
if plaintiffs wanted to sue in federal court, they could make that
choice initially. The purpose behind the removal statute, then, was
to level the litigation playing field by permitting a defendant sued
in state court to counterbalance the plaintiff’s choice of forum. In
addition, the removal statute is intended to address the problem of
in-state bias against out-of-state defendants sued in state court.
The Shamrock Oil Court further emphasized that removal was a
defendant’s right, especially when a defendant might assert a
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

1604

Id. § 1441(c).
Id. § 1446(b)(2)(a).
Id. § 1453(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105 (1941).
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counterclaim against a plaintiff.292 Even though the defendant’s
counterclaim might present an arguable basis for federal court
jurisdiction, the Court held that under these circumstances a
plaintiff sued in the counterclaim could not then remove the case to
federal court.293 Because the plaintiff originally could choose the
forum, it made no sense to allow plaintiffs two bites at the apple: to
sue first in state court and then to change minds and seek removal
to federal court if a defendant asserted a counterclaim against the
original plaintiff.
Since the Court’s Shamrock Oil decision, lower federal courts
consistently have upheld the doctrine that plaintiffs may not remove
a case in response to a defendant’s assertion of a counterclaim, which
is a plain application of the Shamrock Oil holding. However, the
Shamrock Oil Court was not faced with—and therefore did not
address—the problem of the removability of a state court case
when a third-party is impleaded into a lawsuit as a consequence of
a defendant asserting a counterclaim against this new defendant
who was never named as a plaintiff or a defendant in the original
action. This is precisely the problem presented by the appeal in
Home Depot Inc. v. Jackson that recently came before the Court.294
For more than 50 years, based on the Shamrock Oil precedent,
federal courts have refused to permit third-party defendants sued
in a state court counterclaim to remove the case to federal court.
And, building on these precedents, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have similarly refused to permit a third-party
counterclaim defendant sued in a class action to remove the case
under the CAFA removal provision, § 1453(b).295
The Home Depot litigation illustrates the complexity of the class
counterclaim removal issue raised in the context of the CAFA. As
such, the case not only involves the complex interplay of numerous
statutory provisions but implicates the policy reasons behind
CAFA’s enactment. A decision refusing to permit a class
counterclaim to be removed to federal court enhances the
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id. at 106–08.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019).
See, e.g., Tri-State Water Treatment, Inc. v. Bauer, 845 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 2017); In re
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2012); Palisades Collections L.L.C.
v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008); Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014 (9th
Cir. 2007).
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independent ability of state courts to adjudicate class litigation,
which generally will favor the plaintiffs pursing the class litigation.
In contrast, a decision upholding removal of class action counterclaims pursuant to CAFA generally will favor the corporate
defendants subject to such class counterclaims.
B. Preserving State Court Jurisdiction:
Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson
In Home Depot U.S.A v. Jackson, the Court in a 5-4 decision held
that the general removal statute does not permit removal to federal
court by a third-party counterclaim defendant who is sued in state
court.296 The Court’s liberal Justices—clearly favoring the plaintiff’s
ability to keep its consumer class action case in state court—were
joined by Justice Thomas to form the prevailing majority.297 The
Court’s conservative cohort—Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh,
and Chief Justice Roberts—filed a lengthy dissenting opinion
arguing that CAFA had essentially expanded removal jurisdiction
to cover the removal situation of a third-party counterclaim
defendant.298 The dissenters noted that the majority’s decision
effectively undercut and defeated CAFA’s main underlying policy
rationale, which is to protect class action defendants against
unfavorable state court forums.
1. The problem of the third-party counterclaim defendant
The underlying facts in Home Depot demonstrate how an
individual state court action can be transformed by a defendant’s
class action counterclaim into a battle over forum selection. In June
2016, Citibank N.A. sued George Jackson in North Carolina state
court alleging that Jackson failed to pay for a water treatment
system Jackson purchased using a Citibank credit card.299 Jackson
purchased the water treatment system from Carolina Water
Systems, in coordination with Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., which
provided the water system and arranged for installment. In
addition, Home Depot arranged for financing by offering Jackson a
296.
297.
298.
299.

See generally Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. 1743.
Id. at 1745–51.
Id. at 1751–65.
Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 139 S.
Ct. 1743 (2019).
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Home Depot–branded credit card issued by Citibank. Citibank
serviced the credit card debt.300
In August 2016, Jackson answered Citibank’s complaint and
asserted a class action counterclaim against Home Depot and CWS,
as third-party defendants.301 The putative class consisted of
approximately 286 people who had purchased water systems from
Home Depot and CWS in North Carolina. Jackson’s counterclaim
was grounded in consumer fraud claims under North Carolina
state law. Jackson alleged that the third-party defendants engaged
in unfair and deceptive trade practices about the water treatment
systems, and that Citibank was jointly and severally liable because
Home Depot sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank.302 In
September 2016, Citibank voluntarily dismissed its collection
claims against Jackson, leaving Home Depot and CWS as the only
third-party defendants to Jackson’s counterclaim.303
In October 2016, Home Depot filed a notice of removal in the
federal district court for Western District of North Carolina, under
CAFA.304 CAFA permits “any defendant” to remove a state class
action to federal court.305 Home Depot also filed a motion asking
the federal court to realign the parties and to designate Jackson as
the plaintiff and Home Depot and CWS as defendants. Jackson then
filed a motion to remand the case back to North Carolina state court
and amended his complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.306
In March 2017, the federal district court denied Home Depot’s
motion to realign the parties and granted Jackson’s motion to
remand the case to state court,307 relying on Fourth Circuit
precedent in Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts.308 The court
indicated that because Home Depot was not an original defendant
in Citibank’s collection lawsuit against Jackson, Home Depot did
not have a right to remove the class action to federal court.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Citibank, N.A. v. Jackson, No. 3:16-CV-00712-GCM, 2017 WL 1091367, at *2–4
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2017) (citing Palisades Collections L.L.C. v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.
2008)), aff’d, 880 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019).
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders.309
Relying on Shamrock Oil, the appellate court held that removal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) did not permit removal by a defendant to
a claim asserted as a counterclaim.310 In addition, the court rejected
Home Depot’s argument that CAFA expanded the class of
defendants who can remove a case to federal court to include a
third-party defendant to a counterclaim.311
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress, in enacting CAFA,
used the well-established meaning of the term “defendant” to
describe the parties entitled to removal, and this did not include
removal by parties facing counterclaims.312 The court noted that all
other circuit courts to consider the issue under CAFA had similarly
decided that CAFA did not expand the right of removal under these
circumstances.313 The court also affirmed the district court’s refusal
to realign the parties, concluding that no party to the litigation was
attempting to evade limits on diversity jurisdiction.314
2. Arguments to the Supreme Court
On appeal, the parties’ arguments to the Supreme Court are
worth canvassing, in light of how closely the majority and
dissenting opinions subsequently tracked and adopted those same
arguments. The issues that confronted the Supreme Court concerned
how courts should characterize an involuntary third-party
defendant who is sued in a class action counterclaim in order to
apply the general removal statute, the CAFA removal provision,
and the Shamrock Oil holding on non-removable counterclaims.
Home Depot essentially asked the Court to determine who exactly
is a defendant for removal purposes. Home Depot contended, as
against prevailing circuit law, that a third-party class action
counterclaim defendant was a defendant under the general and
CAFA removal provisions, and that circuit courts had
misinterpreted and misapplied the Shamrock Oil holding.315
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Jackson, 880 F.3d at 167.
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168–69.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 170, 172–73.
Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, 11–12, Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct.
1743 (2019) (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 5920364.
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Home Depot argued that it unquestionably was a defendant in
the underlying litigation, and that it was involuntarily brought into
the litigation by the original defendant Jackson when Jackson chose
to assert a consumer class action counterclaim against Citibank.
Home Depot pointed out that it never was a plaintiff in the lawsuit.
Therefore, the Court should not extend the Shamrock Oil originalplaintiff exception (regarding non-removability of counterclaims)
to prohibit removal by a third-party counterclaim defendant such
as itself. Home Depot argued that the Shamrock Oil decision set
forth a limitation on removability based on an original-plaintiff
rule, not an original-defendant rule. A third-party defendant to a
counterclaim “is not a plaintiff under any definition of that word.”316
Home Depot contended that the text, structure, and history of
the general removal statutes dictate that a third-party defendant
that was involuntarily brought into a lawsuit as a consequence of a
counterclaim was a defendant that should be able to avail itself of
the general removal provisions. Home Depot pointed to the
statutory language stating that “a defendant or defendants” may
remove a state case to federal court.317
Home Depot asked the Court to clarify that a third-party
defendant—a party that was a defendant to a counterclaim but was
not a plaintiff in any capacity—has the same removal rights as any
other defendant in the case. Construing the language of § 1441(a),
Home Depot noted that the general removal statute was
unambiguous in conferring removal rights on defendants. Nothing
in the statutory language suggested that a third-party counterclaim
defendant in a state court action should not be treated as a
defendant who was entitled to remove a case.318
Moreover, consistent with the rationales for removal, if a thirdparty was an out-of-state defendant, that party should be entitled
to removal even if the basis is a counterclaim. Thus, Home Depot
maintained that the same local bias concerns that animated the
Framers to provide defendants with a removal right should logically
extend to protect out-of-state third-party defendants.319

316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 15–31.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 24–32.
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In addition, Home Depot maintained that Congress intentionally
expanded the notion of who could remove a case to federal court
when it enacted CAFA, by choosing to designate that “any
defendant” could exercise the right of removal of a state-based class
action. Home Depot suggested that because a third-party
defendant qualified as a defendant for the purposes of the general
removal statute, a third-party defendant therefore also came within
the CAFA language permitting removal by “any defendant.”
Simply put, Home Depot stated that its argument “boils down to
this: ‘any defendant’ means any defendant.”320
At length, Home Depot rehearsed the CAFA legislative history
generally, noting that Congress intended to relieve defendants
from abusive state class action litigation and provide defendants
sued in state courts the ability to remove these cases into federal
court. To this end, Congress deliberately liberalized CAFA removal
provisions in § 1453 to enable class action defendants to remove
more easily than under the general removal statutes. Thus, to
endorse a rule that prohibited third-party class action counterclaim
defendants from removing state class actions to federal court
significantly undermined the purposes of CAFA.321
Home Depot pointed out that the prevailing circuit court
holdings that deny removal to third-party class action counterclaim
defendants had encouraged gamesmanship on the part of class
action lawyers. Thus, in order to evade the CAFA removal
provisions, some plaintiffs’ attorneys had hit upon the stratagem of
filing state class actions as counterclaims, thereby evading CAFA
removal. As a consequence of this misinterpretation of Shamrock
Oil, Home Depot argued, it had been left stuck defending against a
consumer class action in state court, without any right of removal,
and against its will.322
In response, Jackson simply argued that CAFA did not create
an exception to Shamrock Oil’s longstanding rule that prohibits a
counterclaim defendant from removing a case to federal court.323
Initially, Jackson pointed out that every circuit court that had

320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 32–45.
Id. at 41–45.
Brief for Respondent at 14, Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019)
(No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 6584716.
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considered this same issue has decided there was no right of
removal, and therefore there was no conflict among the circuit
courts that justified the Supreme Court re-examining this removal
issue. In addition, Jackson noted that the Court had denied
certiorari on this same issue three times in recent years, including
an appeal by Home Depot just the year prior in another similar
case.324
Jackson argued that four circuit courts, in eight decisions
relating to CAFA removal in the thirteen years since CAFA’s
enactment, have correctly construed CAFA to bar removal by
counterclaim defendants. 325 Jackson noted that the appellate
decisions on this narrow issue had been remarkable in their
consistency, holding that the term “defendant” in CAFA means the
same thing as in Shamrock Oil and its progeny.326 Moreover, the
Respondent suggested that a circuit split was unlikely to develop
given that the courts had found Home Depot’s arguments to be
unpersuasive and were likely to continue to do so.327
Jackson’s response to Home Depot’s arguments was chiefly
grounded in principles of careful statutory construction. In rebuttal
to Home Depot’s contention that Congress’s use of the term “any
defendant” in CAFA extended the removal right to counterclaim
defendants, Jackson argued that in using the word “any,” Congress
intended to eliminate the judicially recognized rule that all
defendants must consent to removal.328 However, there was no
indication that Congress intended to alter the traditional rule that
only an original defendant may remove a case to federal court.
Hence, Jackson contended that Home Depot was attempting to give
the word “any” a meaning it cannot bear, and the word “any”
cannot be used to change the meaning of the word “defendant.”329
Furthermore, Jackson found additional support for his statutory
construction argument in CAFA’s express statement that class
actions are to be removed in accordance with the removal provision

324. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 1, Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471),
2018 WL 3199156; see also Tri-State Water Treatment, Inc. v. Bauer, 845 F.3d 350 (7th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2138
325. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 324, at 6, 11.
326. Id. at 11.
327. Brief for Respondent, supra note 323, at 37–38.
328. Id. at 37.
329. Id. at 38.
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in § 1446. Section 1446 sets forth technical procedures for removal.
This provision echoes § 1441(a) and Shamrock Oil in referring to
removal by “[a] defendant or defendants.” Thus, argued Jackson, it
would be incoherent to give the word “defendant” as used in
CAFA a more expansive meaning when CAFA itself incorporates
by reference procedures that apply to traditional classes of
defendants. Nothing in the statutory language of CAFA called for
a different construction of the term defendant than is used in the
pre-existing removal statutes.330
Jackson further claimed that the nub of the issue presented was
not really the scope of the Court’s Shamrock Oil holding. Jackson
noted that Home Depot had not asked the Court to overrule
Shamrock Oil, and had disavowed any intention to challenge the
correctness of the Shamrock Oil ruling that precludes third-party
counter-defendant’s removal rights under § 1441.331 Instead,
Jackson suggested that the only question was whether Congress
altered the understanding of the word “defendant” (as used in
§ 1441) when Congress enacted CAFA. This issue, Jackson remarked,
was an issue of congressional intent, and not the scope of Shamrock
Oil’s holding.332
In response to Home Depot’s policy arguments, Jackson
countered that Home Depot’s forecasts of gamesmanship and
parade of horribles consisted largely of chimerical monsters.333
Jackson noted that in contrast to Home Depot’s exaggerated claims,
the reality was that in more than a dozen years since CAFA’s
enactment, the issue concerning the removability of class
counterclaims had produced only eight appellate cases in four
circuits. This paucity of cases, Jackson suggested, was a mere drop
in the bucket compared to the hundreds of cases filed in state court
and removed under CAFA.334
Moreover, Jackson submitted, the scarcity of cases raising this
issue might be explained by the fact that consumers and their
lawyers have little or no control over where they may be sued, or
more likely will lack the resources to pursue class action

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
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counterclaims.335 Thus, “[s]peculation that ‘wily’ class action
lawyers are lulling corporate plaintiffs into suing their clients in socalled ‘magnet jurisdictions’ to generate non-removable class actions
is unrealistic, to say the least.”336
Finally, Jackson suggested that Home Depot and those amici
who shared its belief that the courts’ interpretations of the CAFA
removal provision created a loophole that undermined its
purposes, have a remedy: they should take their complaint to
Congress to amend CAFA to expressly permit counterclaim
defendant removal.337
C. The Court’s Home Depot Opinions: Saving State Court Jurisdiction
The Court in Home Depot issued a split 5-4 decision. The Court’s
majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, largely tracked
Jackson’s arguments, narrowly construing both the statutory
language of the general removal statute and its historical
application. Similarly, the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
Alito, closely adopted Home Depot’s arguments on appeal. Home
Depot, then, was a victory for both plaintiffs’ class action lawyers
and state courts to retain jurisdiction over state class actions.
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, construing both the general
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and the CAFA removal
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), concluded that the term “defendant”
refers only to a party that an original plaintiff sues, and not to any
other type of defendant.338 Considering the phrase “defendant or
the defendants” in the structure of the removal statutes, as well as
the Court’s precedents, the majority held that § 1441(a) does not
permit removal by a counterclaim defendant, including parties
who are brought into the litigation for the first time by a
counterclaim.339
The majority noted that the removal statutes apply to civil
actions, not to claims—citing precedent for the proposition that

335. Id. at 25.
336. Linda S. Mullenix, Just Who is a Defendant? Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants’

Removal Rights Under CAFA, PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 581 (2019),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3311178.
337. Brief for Respondent, supra note 323, at 26.
338. Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1745–46 (2019).
339. Id. at 1748.
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counterclaims cannot serve as the basis for federal court
jurisdiction.340 The Court held that § 1441(a) does not permit
removal based on a counterclaim at all, because a counterclaim is
irrelevant to whether a district court has original jurisdiction over
a civil action.341 In addition, the Court analyzed the use of the term
“defendant” in related procedural contexts and concluded that
Congress did not intend for the term “defendant or defendants” in
the general removal statute to include third-party counterclaim
defendants.342 Finally, the majority cited its decision in Shamrock Oil
to further undergird its conclusion that third-party counterclaim
defendants were not defendants who could remove under
§ 1441(a).343
Regarding Home Depot’s contention that the language in
CAFA’s removal provision § 1453(b)—referring to removability by
“‘any defendant’ to a ‘class action’”—the majority indicated that it
agreed with Jackson’s interpretation and not Home Depot’s more
expansive view.344 The Court held that, interpreting the general
removal and CAFA removal provisions together, the CAFA
removal provision, like § 1441(a), did not permit third-party
counterclaim removal. 345 Carefully parsing CAFA’s various
removal provisions and statutory language, the Court concluded
that nothing in the CAFA removal provisions altered § 1441(a)’s
limitation on who can remove. Further, the Court indicated that
this suggested that Congress intended to keep the removability
limitation to original defendants in place.346
Finally, the majority agreed that if Home Depot did not like the
majority’s interpretation, because it enabled a tactic to prevent
removal, this result was a consequence of the statute that Congress
wrote.347 Thus, the majority opinion concluded with an invitation
to Congress to amend the statute, if Congress shared the dissenting
Justice’s disapproval of the majority’s holdings.348

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
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At the very outset of his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito made
oblique reference to the underlying purposes of CAFA; that is,
Congress’s concern with unfavorable, plaintiff-biased state court
forums for the resolution of class action litigation. Thus, he noted,
“The rule of law requires neutral forums for resolving disputes.
Courts are designed to provide just that. But our legal system takes
seriously the risk that for certain cases, some neutral forums might
be more neutral than others.”349 Building on this foundational
principle, Justice Alito noted that the general removal statute ensured
that defendants get an equal chance to choose a federal forum.350
The dissenting opinion largely focuses on CAFA’s language
that permits removal “by any defendant,” and largely tracks the
statutory exegesis advanced by Home Depot. The dissenting opinion
goes to great lengths to attempt to rationalize and integrate the
removal provisions consistently, invoking canons of statutory
construction, dictionary definitions, and judicial precedent,351
including a limited reading of the scope of the Shamrock Oil decision
(so as not to apply at all to counterclaim defendants).352
Apart from the lengthy analyses in statutory construction,
much of the dissent resorts to the underlying purpose of CAFA that
framed the dissenting opinion’s opening passages. Thus, the
opinion rehearses the history of CAFA and other Congressional
initiatives to curb perceived abuses of class action litigation.353
Commenting on Congress’s intent in enacting CAFA, Justice Alito
noted that Congress was concerned that state courts were biased
against class action defendants and had passed CAFA to facilitate
removal of state class actions to federal court, “by any
defendant.”354
Hence, the dissenting Justices contended that both original
defendants and third-party counterclaim defendants were
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 1751 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1755–61.
Id. at 1761–62 (contending that Shamrock Oil says nothing about the removability
of counterclaim defendants, and therefore has no application to Home Depot’s case). In
addition, Justice Alito also rejected the majority’s reliance on the so-called well-pleaded
complaint rule for its conclusions. Justice Alito suggested that the well-pleaded complaint
rule was based on policy concerns that did not arise in the context of the Home Depot
litigation. Id. at 1763–64.
353. Id. at 1752–54.
354. Id. at 1751.
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“defendants” under both the general and CAFA removal
statutes.355 Both kinds of parties were defendants to legal claims
and neither chose to be in state court. “Both might face bias there,
and with it the potential for crippling unjust losses.”356 The majority
opinion, Justice Alito asserted, “reads an irrational distinction into
both [the] removal laws and flouts their plain meaning, a meaning
that context confirms and today’s majority simply ignores.”357
In concluding his CAFA discussion, Justice Alito noted that by
conflating the definition of “defendant” in both the general and
CAFA removal statutes, courts had created a loophole tactic that
permitted plaintiffs to raise a class action claim as a counterclaim
and hope that CAFA would not authorize removal. This loophole
tactic, Justice Alito suggested, subverted CAFA’s evident aims.358
D. The Implications of Home Depot
for Federal-State Class Action Litigation
The significance of the Home Depot decision lays in its policy
implications for litigation gamesmanship. In their arguments to the
Court, both Home Depot and Jackson spelled out the potential
implications of the Court’s decision. It remains to be seen whether
the prophesying by either party will be realized in the years to
come. One may expect that while plaintiffs’ attorneys welcome the
opportunity to pursue class litigation in state court immune from
CAFA removal, this opportunity may be cabined by the unique
circumstances that give rise to the situation in which a plaintiff
asserts a class action counterclaim against a third-party defendant.
Home Depot argued that class action plaintiffs’ attorneys, who
prefer to litigate class actions in favorable state court forums, have
seized upon the tactic of making their class actions removal-proof
by asserting class claims as counterclaims. Home Depot contended
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 1751–52.
Id. at 1752.
Id.
Id. at 1755. Justice Alito protested:
“I can think of no rational purpose for this limit on which defendants may remove.
Even respondent does not try to defend its rationality, suggesting instead that it
simply reflects a legislative compromise. Yet there is no evidence that anyone
thought of this potential loophole before CAFA was enacted, and it is hard to
believe that any of CAFA’s would-be opponents agreed to vote for it in exchange
for this way of keeping some cases in state court.”

Id.
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that because of this constricted view of who constitutes a defendant
for removal purposes, it was unable to remove the class action
counterclaim by which it was involuntarily brought into the
litigation. Home Depot complains that it was unfairly stuck in a
state court forum not of its choosing.
In addition, corporate defendants clearly prefer to adjudicate
class claims in more favorable federal forums. Home Depot pointed
out that the risks for financial institutions are similarly high. Thus,
according to Home Depot, financial institutions will now think
twice about bringing individual collection actions in state court,
only to find themselves subject to non-removable class action
counterclaims. It remains to be seen if corporate defendants will
restrain from bringing collection actions in state court under the
fear of retaliatory consumer class counterclaims. Home Depot’s
concern about strategic pleading to evade CAFA was supported by
an array of defense-oriented organizations that filed amicus briefs
on behalf of Home Depot.359
Jackson, however, countered that these hypothesized scenarios
were largely over-stated, as evidenced by the scarcity of actual
cases where counterclaim defendants in state class litigation have
been denied removal to federal court. We will have to wait to see if
there is a proliferation of consumer class action counterclaims
brought when a plaintiff (or financial institution) sues an original
defendant in state court.
Finally, it may come to pass that a Congress will heed the
majority’s suggestion that, if Congress does not like the result in
Home Depot, it can go back to the legislative drawing board to clarify
whether third-party counterclaim defendants may remove class
actions against defendants sued in state court.

359. See, e.g., Brief of DRI—The Voice of the Def. Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 6062446; Brief of the Prod. Liab.
Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743
(No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 2427598; Brief for Amici Curiae Retail Litig. Ctr., Inc., Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S., and the Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. in Support of Petitioner,
Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 6040478; Brief for Amici Curiae Retail
Litig. Ctr., Inc. and Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. in Support of Petitioner, Home Depot,
139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 2412127; Brief of Wash. Legal Found. and Allied Educ.
Found. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471),
2018 WL 6040477.
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CONCLUSION
The prevailing post-CAFA narrative posits we live in an era of
federalized class actions. While there is some empirical evidence to
support this thesis,360 other scholarly studies suggest that the class
action landscape is perhaps more complicated.361 In addition, the
post-CAFA narrative incorporates a kind of procedural conspiracy
theory, suggesting that in the twenty-first century a corporatefavoring Congress and a conservative Court have indirectly
colluded to suppress class litigation.362 In this telling, Congress and
the Court, in behest of their corporate sponsors, have pursued an
anti-plaintiff, pro-corporate class action agenda through legislation
and judicial fiat. The greatest manifestation of this agenda, then,
was CAFA itself, with the goal of federalizing class litigation in
federal court for the purpose of subverting and defeating class
litigation.363
And yet in the fifteen years since CAFA’s enactment, states
have maintained a role in private and public complex or aggregate
litigation enforcement. It is simply not true that all class litigation
has been effectively federalized; a more nuanced appreciation of
dual court system litigation is in order. While many federal courts
historically have intervened in state proceedings to protect pending
federal class settlements, courts have not always applied
abstention, Anti-Injunction, and Erie doctrines in derogation of
state court litigation.
Contrary to the prevalent notion that the Court ideologically
favors corporate defendants in class litigation, the Court instead
360. See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1723 (2008) (documenting an uptick of removal filings post-CAFA).
361. See Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of
Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (reporting data
on class action filings post-CAFA; suggesting multiple explanations for decline in both state
and federal class actions filings after CAFA).
362. Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (”[A]ny sentient reader of [CAFA]’s
statement of findings and purposes [would recognize that t]hey are, at best, window
dressing. Less charitably, they meet the philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s definition of
‘bullshit,’ because they are made with apparent indifference to their truth content.” (footnote
omitted)); Burbank, supra note 165, at 1440–44.
363. Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1765, 1816 (2008) (describing the goal of many of CAFA’s proponents to defeat class actions
against them).
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has issued decisions that have preserved the ability of state courts
to determine class certification issues under state rules and that
have preserved the ability of state attorneys general to pursue
aggregate relief on behalf of state citizens in parens patriae litigation.
In addition, the Court’s decision in the Home Depot class
counterclaim litigation reflects a jurisprudence favoring state court
retention of class litigation, immunized from CAFA removal.
Rather than favoring defendants, these decisions have been
decidedly pro-plaintiff, especially for states, such as West Virginia,
which embrace a liberal class action jurisprudence and Mississippi
with an aggressively pro-plaintiff state AG.
The corporate-favoring CAFA narrative is predicated on the
assumption that, with regard to class litigation, state courts
generally are plaintiff-favoring while federal courts generally are
defendant-favoring. Not only is this an over-simplification of
judicial biases, but not every state-filed class litigation has been
successfully removed to federal court to accomplish a defendantfavoring outcome. CAFA’s home state and local controversy
exceptions have carved out a domain for state retention of class
litigation. As CAFA jurisprudence has developed, several federal
courts (presumably defendant-favoring forums) have applied
liberal constructions of CAFA’s formal rules to enable states to
maintain class litigation of local concern. This phenomenon
complicates the portrait of CAFA as a legislatively pro-defendant
scheme intended to federalize class action litigation.
It is also worth noting that in the Court’s decisions touching on
the allocation of complex litigation between federal and state
courts, the Court has achieved a unanimity that seems to belie
ideological orientations—and contrasts with the Court’s otherwise
ideologically fractured decisions in other types of appeals. How is
one to explain this odd-bedfellows convergence of decision-making
concerning the Court’s cases that implicate dual system complex
litigation? At least one possible explanation is that the Court’s
conservative wing recognizes the federalism values in preserving
state court autonomy, while the Court’s liberal wing pragmatically
endorses results that best empower plaintiffs to vindicate their
rights—that is, in state court forums.
The “federalization” narrative of class action litigation is further
complicated by the shift, in the past decade, towards federal
1619
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multidistrict procedure means for resolving aggregate litigation.364
This well-documented phenomenon adds another nuanced layer to
an appreciation concerning how complex litigation currently
is handled in a dual court system. Aggregate litigation that is
transferred and consolidated under MDL auspices may or may not
be resolved by class action settlements.365 In addition, federal MDL
procedure may incompletely capture all related litigation because
state non-removable class litigation will remain outside the reach
of federal global settlements.
Thus, not only do we live in a post-CAFA era, but we live in a
post-class action era.366 In recognition of this reality, one scholar has
suggested that the existence of non-removable state class litigation
“hold[s] promise, if properly harnessed, as [a] mechanism[] for
achieving the goals of aggregate litigation and for meeting the
challenges presented by the reality that mass litigation settlements
occupy an important regulatory role in the American legal
system.”367 This scholar creatively has suggested that parallel nonremovable state class litigation can help discipline federal mass
litigation settlements in four keys ways:
one, by providing needed real-world data for use in any ultimate
settlement grid; two, by ensuring greater legitimacy of those
settlements as mechanisms of governance; three, by potentially
making any ultimate settlements fairer to litigants; and four, by
providing settlement finality through greater assurance that any
resulting settlement terms will stick.368

In the post-CAFA enthusiasm inspired by the nationalization of
class litigation, the federalism issues engendered by CAFA have
gone largely unnoticed and unremarked. Professor Stephen
Burbank, commenting on CAFA’s complicated jurisdictional

364. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018) (multidistrict litigation statute). See generally Andrew D.
Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1168–69 (2018)
(reporting statistics of MDL proceedings in federal courts).
365. See Linda S. Mullenix, Policing MDL Non-Class Settlements: Empowering Judges
Through the All Writs Act, 37 REV. LITIG. 129, 153–60 (2018) (discussing MDL non-class
settlements); Amy L. Saack, Global Settlements in Non-Class MDL Mass Torts, 21 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 847 (2017) (same).
366. Glover, supra note 4.
367. Id. at 7.
368. Id.
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scheme, has called CAFA “an affront to federalism.”369 Without
regard to whether the Court has endorsed an implicit federalism of
class litigation, state courts nonetheless, under federalism principles,
have retained the right to adjudicate aggregate litigation in their
courts. This includes the authority to “define the features of
aggregate litigation, and the procedural framework” for resolving
it.370 In this view, a nationalized, homogeneous class certification
jurisprudence, based on federal courts’ narrowest interpretation of
Rule 23, “is fundamentally at odds with the constitutional division
of function[s]” between federal and state courts.371
In conclusion, the prevailing CAFA narrative concerning
federalization of class action litigation needs to be tempered with
an appreciation of the Court’s several decisions touching on the
states’ authority to adjudicate complex litigation in their own
courts. As discussed above, although the Court’s decisions rarely
explicitly invoke federalism theories, several scholars have
suggested that the Court instead has hazarded an “accidental
federalism” that has constrained federal class litigation, based on

369. Burbank, supra note 165, at 1446–47.

Ultimately, a combination of special interest overreaching, abetted by the fictions
of corporate citizenship, and confusion about legislative aims, abetted by the
institutional federal judiciary’s schizophrenia regarding overlapping class actions,
led Congress to lose sight of its duty, when fashioning CAFA’s exceptions, to
preserve the “happy relation of States to Nation.” As a result, CAFA represents an
affront to federalism in two respects and a potential affront in a third.
First, CAFA deprives states of the ability to regulate matters of intense local
interest by enlisting for that purpose the regulatory potential of the class action as
the states conceive it, on the basis of a definition of national interest that rests on
legal fictions and on a vision of aggregate litigation that ignores the costs of
complexity. Second, and quite apart from the regulatory void that CAFA may
entail, the means by which Congress reached that result are deplorable. Working
with exceptions so complicated that even some academics have been unable to
penetrate them—and in a fog of ambiguity and hypocrisy—Congress sacrificed
transparency and accountability in the interests of preserving deniability. Third,
by exalting the gathering powers of the federal courts, Congress has created
incentives for litigants and courts to create ever bigger “litigations.” Whether in
the form of multistate class actions or through nonclass aggregations, such
litigation packages may replicate in federal court some of the supposed abuses in
state court class actions to which CAFA supposedly responded, including the
subordination of factual and legal differences of intense interest to individual
states.
Id. (footnote omitted).
370. Margaret S. Thomas, Constitutionalizing Class Certification, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1024,
1069 (2017).
371. Id. at 1070.
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rationales that are independent of federalism concerns.372 In this
view, “the Court’s class action cases might, in fact, reflect an untheorized or intuitive sense that federalism principles shape federal
courts’ use of the class action.”373 Thus, it is worth noting that the
Court, in recognizing the autonomy of state courts to resolve
complex litigation, may implicitly have been countering the
“affront to federalism” that is embodied in CAFA.

372. Moller, supra note 121, at 862–63 (citing Glover’s “happenstantial” federalism).
373. Id.
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